Bangladesh has existed for 53 years, and of these, 34 years have been under ‘democratic rule’. On 7 January 2024, the country had its 12th parliamentary elections which were described as “controversial”. With the main opposition not taking part in the elections, is the country heading towards a one-party state?
Bangladesh has a long legacy of electoral controversies and the stage-managed 2024 parliamentary election was no different. Described as the ‘special election operation’ and the ‘one-woman show’, the election was a foregone conclusion for the ruling Awami League (AL) even before actual voting began. The incumbent Prime Minister and leader of the AL was on course to serve a fourth consecutive term (fifth in total), benefitting from political continuity. However, critics pointed out that the victory was only possible because the election was so one-sided and non-competitive with low voter turnout, similar to the 2014 and 2018 elections, described by international media as ‘farcical’ and ‘transparently fraudulent’. The main political opposition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the 2024 election like it had previously done so in 2014. Ahead of the election, the government arrested thousands of BNP leaders and activists in a crackdown to ensure that the BNP was not able to instigate a street agitation campaign.
In the 2024 election, official AL candidates won 222 seats and 62 were won by so-called ‘independent’ candidates. From the ‘independent’ candidates, 58 have been lifelong AL members or supporters who did not secure the party’s nomination, but were nevertheless officially approved, giving the impression of a competitive election. The AL won 95 percent of the total contested seats (284 0f 298) while the Jatiyo Party (JP), an AL ally which is acting as official opposition, won 11 seats by fielding AL-endorsed candidates, possibly to reassure the AL that they would not be so audacious to challenge them. Even the 14-party Alliance won two seats by using the AL’s election symbol of the boat. For the 50 seats reserved for women in parliament, 50 submitted nominations went through unopposed, allowing the nominees to be MPs without the need for a single vote to be casted. Interestingly, the make-up of the 50 quota MPs consisted of 48 from the AL and its allies, while 2 were from the opposition JP. Despite the AL having a significant majority of the 350 MPs in parliament, the significant number of seats won by ‘independent’ candidates throws into question what kind of parliamentary dynamics and coalitions will emerge going forward, especially with smaller political parties, and what will Bangladesh politics look like in the near future.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party
In the months leading up to the election it became obvious that the BNP would not participate without a non-partisan neutral caretaker government – a provision the AL abolished in 2011 through the 15th constitutional amendment when it had a parliamentary majority. This was an early indication that major global bodies and liberal democracies were convinced that the elections were not going to be inclusive or with full participation, especially as the BNP is the only party that could challenge the AL’s dominance in any meaningful way, hence, the election was a setback for parliamentary democracy. Therefore, international bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, and many Western governments reacted to this by refraining from sending fully staffed observer missions to monitor elections in Bangladesh.
The BNP actively encouraged the public from desisting from voting and declared a general strike on election day. This was a reaction to widespread intimidation, the arrest of BNP leaders and activists as well as fast-track convictions where the AL used state apparatuses like the legal system against its political opponents. Mirza Fakrul Islam Alamgir, BNP Secretary General, was sued in 11 cases and sent to jail on 29 October 2023 and was released a few months later on 15 February 2024 after the election. In hindsight, the BNP were caught between a rock and a hard place for boycotting the election in the same way it had done in 2014. In both instances the BNP was unable to galvanise public opinion or conduct a resilient street agitation campaign to topple the government, a feat successfully achieved by the AL in 1996.
Despite the BNP participating in the 2018 election, the result was so overwhelmingly lopsided in favour of the AL that even AL party hawks were embarrassed at their supposed election landslide victory. Despite 80 percent of eligible voters casting their votes, the election was marred by allegations of widespread ballot-box stuffing and result manipulation which shattered public confidence in the electoral system, as reflected in low voter turnout for elections that have taken place since then. One example is the recent by-elections in Dhaka-17 and Chattogram-10, where turnout was just over 11 percent, whereas historically the AL’s vote bank was around 35 percent of the entire voting population. This suggests that the AL’s own voter base does not participate in stage-managed elections.
If the BNP participated and lost in the latest elections either by not having a public mandate or due to election fraud, at least it could have said it tried within an unfair system. By not going to the polls without a non-partisan caretaker government, the BNP leadership neglected the pressing concerns of the electorate related to the cost-of-living crisis and tackling the endemic corruption taking place in all strata of the country. Low voter turnout indicated political choice was limited only to different shades of the AL; therefore, the public lost its appetite and interest in voting in the election. Boycotting the election turned out to be a suicidal policy for the BNP and has further added to the process of its marginalisation. At least in the previous parliament the BNP had seven MPs that could have potentially held the government to account. In the current parliament, with a total absence of a credible opposition, the AL has a free reign. To further incapacitate the BNP during its election campaign, AL leaders termed the BNP as a ‘terrorist’ group that ‘has no right to do politics’. As the BNP has been out of power for the past 15 years, an entire generation has grown up without seeing it as a leading political party.
How to make elections look free and competitive
Voters in Bangladesh wait five years for the election cycle to come around in which they get the opportunity to pass judgement on the incumbent government by evaluating its track record and examine the credentials of those vying for power. To compensate for the BNP’s boycott and make the elections appear to be inclusive, the government declared voters were not being denied viable options since several political parties were participating in the democratic process. Although there were 44 registered political parties, only 28 of them participated in the election. This represented 63 percent of the parties contesting the election, minus the main opposition. Because the opposition is suppressed and fragmented, the BNP are in no position to make a significant comeback soon due to weaknesses in leadership and governance structures as well as AL strategies to keep it away from frontline politics.
Over the past 15 years, other than the AL, JP, and the Workers Party of Bangladesh, none of the other 28 political parties secured more than one percent of the popular vote. The remaining parties did not win a single seat, proving they had no public support and were only brought in to proliferate the number of parties participating to give the illusion that the election was widely contested, even though four parties were taking part in the election for the first time. Between 2008 and 2018, the AL’s popular vote rose from 48 percent to 74 percent respectively, pointing the obvious that voters decided to stay away from the polls because they were not being presented with viable alternatives. With the AL keeping its most credible opposition out of the contest, the election was not about getting a popular mandate from the people, but more about optics of a participatory contest, even though most participants did not have much public support.
On election day, after casting her vote, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina declared that the election was free and fair and further stated, ‘I am trying my best to ensure that democracy should continue in this country’. However, as the results of the voting came out, it was clear that notions of ‘free’ and ‘fair’ had no connotation with the elections. Democracy is a fundamental principle of the Bangladesh Constitution, and the AL has a rich tradition of fighting for the country’s democratic rights. Nevertheless, how the previous three elections have played out should concern voters about the future of democracy in the country.
Another issue the AL will have to contend with is the numerous factions that have emerged within the party. Many of the party’s core supporters were put into a dilemma whereby they had to vote against their own party candidates in the interests of making the elections appear to be participatory. The question is could this work in the future for purposes of party cohesion? If the AL’s 2014 election victory was superficial, then the 2024 victory was a pyrrhic one which confirmed Bangladesh’s transition from a flawed but somewhat competitive democracy towards a de facto one-party state with some electoral democratic paraphernalia lacking moral legitimacy. Bangladesh’s culture of election engineering, institutional corruption and cronyism means that the AL has consolidated its grip on power through governing uninterrupted for the past 15 years. Unless the AL radically changes its political approach, the country’s 170 million people face ever increasing levels of authoritarianism in the guise of free and fair elections.
The Election Commission
The Election Commission (EC) is a neutral constitutional body assigned to hold and oversee free, fair and participatory elections in Bangladesh. Despite its mandate, in the 5 January 2014 election, the EC accepted 153 MPs as ‘elected’ even though they did not receive a single vote. In a parliament of 300 MPs this was enough to from the next government. In the 2018 election, there was reporting that many eligible voters were denied from casting their votes with further allegations of ballot-stuffing on the eve of the election to such an extent that even AL alliance members mentioned it. This was later publicly acknowledged by the EC who stated that it failed to hold a credible election in 2018. This led to a situation where politicians realised that they could get elected without getting any votes and that voters were not a factor to consider when trying to win elections.
Previously, candidates had to secure enough votes to win, whereas now, all they had to do was to secure the party nomination to guarantee victory. Because of voter less elections, many of the electorate feel that the EC and AL affiliates do the bidding of the AL, and that voter participation was largely cosmetic. Despite its dubious track record, the EC announced it was its intention to ensure the 12th parliamentary elections were inclusive and credible. Having the main stakeholders like the EC, bureaucracy, judiciary, and law enforcement agencies politicised and partisan, will ensure that the ruling party remains in power. But with such a one-sided election, there were significant discussions centred around the future trajectory of politics and what impact this will have on business and the economy.
Shortly after the polls closed on election day the Chief Election Commissioner told a press conference that around 40 percent of all eligible votes were cast, despite local observers considering the number to be significantly lower. This was inconsistent with the voting trend on the day, particularly as the number of votes cast for the first four hours averaged at 4.62 percent per hour. EC Secretary Jahangir Alam, stated voter turnout one hour before the close of polls was 27.15 percent, averaging a voting rate of 3.87 per hour during the first seven hours. However, in the last hour of voting the voter turnout rate significantly jumped to 13 percent going against the trend seen throughout the day. For that reason, the statistic of 13 percent did not seem credible. On 18 January, Chief Election Commissioner Kazi Habibul Awal, publicly acknowledged voters’ confidence in the electoral system had declined, raising suspicion that the neutral EC colluded with the AL. For example, the EC were involved in publicity stunts such as sending an invitation letter to the abandoned BNP office even though the BNP boycotted the election. For aesthetic reasons, the AL and EC focused its attention on ensuring a 50 percent or higher voter turnout instead of enabling an environment conducive to free and participatory elections.
Death of the opposition
Since the creation of Bangladesh, the political opposition has never been strong. In 1973, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won a landslide election and became Prime Minister of the newly formed country. Two years later, Sheikh Mujib created a political front, BaKSAL – Bangladesh Worker-Peasant’s People’s League. The front was made up of four political parties including their factions and was enacted by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of Bangladesh on 25 January 1975. The BaKSAL experiment outlawed all political parties other than BaKSAL effectively making Bangladesh a one-party state by changing the constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential system. The new ‘national’ party restricted the free press and only allowed four state approved newspaper for national circulation. However, tragedy struck in August 1975, when Sheikh Mujib and most of his family were brutally killed in a coup by rogue elements of the army, which paved the way for the army to enter politics and end BaKSAL.
After the end of General Ershad’s military rule, parliamentary elections were held again in 1991 where the BNP got 140 seats, the AL got 88, JP 35, and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) 18. Not having an overall majority, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia formed a coalition government with the JI that gave her coalition a total of 158 out of the 300 MPs. As the opposition the AL had 88 sitting MPs in parliament, but throughout its tenure it was constantly trying to oust the BNP government and demanded that the next election be held under a neutral caretaker government. It frequently walked out, participated in a short-term boycott, and eventually resigned. The synergy between the ruling party and the opposition set the tone for all subsequent opposition parties. In the 1996 parliamentary election held under a caretaker government, the AL got 146 seats, the BNP 116, JP 32, and JI 3. Despite the potential of being a strong opposition, the BNP replicated what the AL had previously done and obstructed the government. This highlighted that the BNP was an opposition simply for the sake of being an opposition. After the 2001 election, the BNP returned to power and the AL as the opposition repeated its walkouts, boycotts, and resignations. The AL returned to power in 2008 in elections held under the military backed caretaker government.
With an absolute majority, the AL abolished the caretaker system for all future elections under the pretext of implementing a high court judgement, which suggested its continuation for two more elections. In recent context, the Bangladeshi parliament has the distinction of being the only parliament in the world under the Westminster system without a legitimate opposition. Although the JP has 11 MPs and may pose as the opposition in the current parliament, it was ‘chosen’ by the AL as both parties collaborated not to confront each other in a number of constituency seats. Given the JPs political position, it lost all credibility as an opposition in parliament because it was not critical of the government, neither did it demand any kind of accountability, which a genuine opposition would have done. Due to the lack of an effective opposition, there was a steady erosion of democratic institutions and practices. As the ruling party has the majority to pass laws, the function of checks and balances among the judiciary, legislative and executive have become useless. The independence of the judiciary has been severely compromised after the 2014 constitutional amendment which gave parliament the power to impeach judges, making the judiciary vulnerable and prejudiced towards partisan influence.
Autocracy and corruption
At present, Bangladesh stands at a crossroads. The country can be described as an elected autocracy where its people are expected to participate in ‘elections without choice’. Bangladesh’s democratic backsliding has been accelerated with the conclusion of the 2024 parliamentary elections that reaffirmed the governments increase in unchecked power. It has significantly weakened democratic institutions where every branch of the government is deeply politicised and led by individuals loyal to PM Sheikh Hasina. As the AL slowly but surely entrenched its power ahead of the election, after ‘winning’ another term in government there seems to be little separation between the AL and state institutions including the civil administration, further weakening the bureaucracy and civil society. If the erosion of democratic practices and political accountability go unimpeded, then Bangladesh is on course to become a de facto one-party authoritarian state where internal or external forces are either powerless or unwilling to do anything to avert this disaster. This trend is easily discernible in Bangladesh’s political situation of the past decade which is providing a pathway for the establishment of authoritarian rule.
Every two years, German research institution, Bertelsmann Stiftung, publishes its report on the global state of democracy via its Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). It discusses the state of the economy, politics, and governance of 137 countries. In its 2024 report, 74 countries were classified as autocracies, of which 25 are ‘moderate’ autocracies and 49 are ‘hard’ autocracies. Since 2018, Bangladesh has been classified as a ‘moderate autocracy’. According to the 2023 annual report of the
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Bangladesh was described as an ‘electoral autocracy’. Although elections are considered a tool of democratisation, in the case of Bangladesh they have become an instrument to legitimise autocratic rule. This was highlighted by the EU’s election expert mission report published on 9 March 2024, which stated, “The 2024 parliamentary election in Bangladesh did not meet some key international standards for democratic elections”. This sentiment was also echoed by the US which maintained “the election was not free or fair”, while the UK’s executive summary of its report stated, essential elements of the democratic process and the respect for human right were not consistently met during the election period, which are indictments of the state of politics and governance in Bangladesh.
At present, unrestrained corruption in every layer of the governance system is the biggest factor which is the hindrance to economic growth and social development. In a study titled ‘The state of the business environment in Bangladesh’, conducted by the Centre for Policy Dialogue in partnership with the World Economic Forum, identified corruption as the singular most problematic factor when it came to conducting business in Bangladesh in 2023. Of the respondents of the study, 67.6 percent suggested that high levels of corruption were to blame. Bangladesh did not also fare well in Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2023, where it secured the second lowest position in South Asia, just above Afghanistan – the lowest score for the country since 2012. Over the last decade and in particular the last five years, corruption at all levels appears to have increased in leaps and bounds across all spheres of life, both public and private. Recent allegations of serious corruption against several government officials have come to the forefront. These include former army chief Aziz Ahmed, former Inspector General of Police and Rapid Action Battalion chief Benazir Ahmed, and a sitting MP who was murdered outside Bangladesh who was allegedly involved in smuggling, are all just the tip of the iceberg. Whether it is public servants working at all levels in government or their family members, corruption appears to have spread its tentacles across the country and has become institutionalised from top to bottom echelons of the government.
Current Issues
Despite decades of sustained GDP growth and progress in social indicators, Bangladesh’s economy is in a precarious position. The AL government faces a moderate risk of running out of its foreign currency reserves and is having a difficult time dealing with increased food and fuel prices, a volatile banking sector, and rampant corruption in all levels of government. With an all-time high in non-performing loans, the banking sector is being sucked dry and the government remains impotent in making timely or effective reforms. Corruption is weakening the governance system of the banks and making the sector increasingly vulnerable to collapse and putting the entire economy at risk. With persistent high inflation (9.72 percent, June 2024), rising poverty, shrinking purchasing power, foreign exchange volatility, external payment challenges, downgrade in growth projections, Bangladesh could be overwhelmed with the economic challenges that lie ahead. These are only a few of the many factors that have significantly lowered the standard of living for most of the people of Bangladesh. All of this has been made significantly worse by the Coronavirus pandemic followed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As the repayment schedule for many of the costly loans used to finance controversial mega projects draws near, the governments ideological legitimacy based on the narrative of economic development success has fallen apart over the past 18 months as the current economic crisis has highlighted the bareness of the development argument.
In January 2023, Bangladesh secured a $4.7 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be paid in 7 instalments over a four year period. This was to combat the pressures on the macroeconomy associated with the economic downslide which had accumulated over many years due to weak economic management. Prior to approving the loan, in September 2023, the IMF expressed concerns over risks of capital flight and suggested Bangladesh implement policy corrections through macroeconomic adjustments, structural reforms, and good institutional governance. Despite PM Sheikh Hasina assuring the Bangladeshi public that the economy will continue to be her priority at the beginning of her fourth term, she will need to start by taking decisive action to tackle economic problems highlighted by prominent economists and think tanks in Bangladesh. In other words, Sheikh Hasina now stands out as the person solely responsible for whatever happens to Bangladesh as she has been at the helm for the past 14 years. The economic turbulence predicted in the country because of the global economic turmoil will land on her doorstep and she and her government will be to blame. The appreciation of the dollar, money laundering, tax evasion, recovering bad loans, energy subsidies to private power plant owners, and the global dip in exports, particularly in readymade garments will all come home to roost in the coming months. Bangladesh’s financial crisis is not over. Although the government met the conditionalities for the first and second IMF reviews, how it will fair in the future remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Putting aside the self-congratulatory rhetoric of the 2024 parliamentary elections, Bangladesh stands at a crossroads with a weakened and weaponized legal system where the concentration of power is solely in the executive. Even though the AL’s victory is being framed as a legitimisation of the current government, it is not without international criticism and will impact Bangladesh’s diplomatic and economic relations with the West, particularly with the US and Europe. Such an outcome poses further ordeals for PM Sheikh Hasina, who has pledged to continue with economic development despite Bangladesh facing multiple challenges with rising food and fuel prices, commodity price volatility, abrupt global slowdown, and systemic financial instability where the prospects of recovery from further shocks remain doubtful, particularly as critical reforms will be challenging to make.
There are some hard messages for the AL from the low voter turnout. Electoral data shows that the AL’s vote bank ranges between 35-40 percent and if total turnout was 41.8 percent according to EC data, then only AL supported used their vote. Undecided voters thought to constitute around 20-25 percent of the electorate and the vote bank of the BNP, estimated to be 30-35 percent did note vote. In total nearly 60 percent of voters stayed away. Hence, the exuberant claim that the current government has the mandate of the people needs to be examined objectively. With the enduring absence of a credible opposition party and an independent legal system, the confidence of the global business community will weaken, and this will impact foreign investment which is crucial to the prospects of economic recovery. Therefore, it is very unlikely that Bangladesh’s economy will continue to thrive within an electoral autocracy without experiencing a major social and economic upheaval by 2025.
As a constitutional body responsible for overseeing the conduct of elections within the bounds of Constitutional and electoral law, the EC has acknowledged that the public’s confidence in the country’s electoral process has decreased with each election, especially as the EC has not addressed deep-rooted issues that come to the forefront prior and post-election. There needs to be a national dialogue to establish an acceptable election management mechanism, otherwise there will be more of the same – the ruling party consolidating its power through all levels of the government structure. There are several reasons behind voter apathy which keeps them away from exercising their democratic franchise, including the absence of credible opposition parties in the election, the EC’s failure to ensure free and impartial elections, and the acceptance of 153 ruling party MP as ‘elected’ in 2014 without a vote being casted in their favour. Under the caretaker government in 2008, the EC had the full trust of the political parties and the voters, but this has not been replicated since and remains elusive.
High incidences of corruption, some of which have been exposed openly in the public domain, particularly at a time when inflation is high and there is a cost-of-living crisis with a slowdown of the economy, have not understandably gone down too well with the electorate and there is a huge threat this could lead to social and economic instability. This is despite the government adopting a zero-tolerance policy for corruption. However, how decisively it is acting to implement its zero-tolerance policy remains to be seen as this cannot be achieved without addressing the root causes of corrupt practices or implementing the required institutional or regulatory reforms to mitigate against corruption. Without free, fair and participatory elections and all the crucial elements of democratic governance, voters will stay away from voting if the outcome has been decided in advance because they do not want to legitimise the stage-managed charade which only benefits the aesthetics of an election. Legitimacy is not gained from ‘winning’ shady elections, but from a mandate from the people who have a vested interest in the social, political and economic future of the country. The only way this can be achieved is through a vibrant and healthy democracy that represents the people as opposed to the interests of the ruling party.Has Bangladesh become a one-party ‘electoral autocracy?’