Bangladesh-Myanmar relations are shaped by a complex mix of history, geography, trade, security issues, and humanitarian concerns such as the Rohingya crisis. Can economic and diplomatic engagements change this dynamic?
Myanmar was the sixth nation to recognise Bangladesh as a sovereign nation following its independence in 1971. Formal diplomatic relations were established on 21 March 1972. On 26 April 1974, U Ne Win, the former President of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (Myanmar), visited Dhaka for a four-day official trip aimed at fostering friendship, goodwill, and cooperation across areas of mutual interest.
Since then, relations have generally remained amicable, with high-level visits between the two nations. However, both nations have had to navigate various diplomatic highs and lows, particularly up until 2011, when Myanmar’s military government transitioned into a quasi-civilian regime. Internally, Myanmar has faced increasing low-intensity insurgencies, ethnic conflicts, and religious persecution.
Looking ahead, a critical question arises: will the Rohingya crisis continue to define Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral relations, or can the two nations focus on areas of common interest, including infrastructure connectivity, tourism, and economic and security cooperation?
Strategic Outlook: Navigating a Fragile Future
The Bangladesh-Myanmar relationship stands at a critical juncture. While the Rohingya crisis continues to dominate bilateral discourse, Bangladesh must adopt a forward-looking strategy that balances humanitarian obligations with national interests. The evolving dynamics in Rakhine State, the growing influence of regional powers, and shifting global attention all demand a recalibration of Dhaka’s foreign policy.
It is increasingly clear that the Rohingya issue is no longer merely a bilateral concern but has become a regional and international challenge. The path forward requires a pragmatic and multi-layered approach that addresses immediate humanitarian needs while pursuing broader strategic objectives, including justice and accountability. By leading with both principle and pragmatism, Bangladesh can transform its southern frontier from a zone of recurring crisis into one of opportunity and sustainable cooperation.
Rohingya Repatriation
Since August 2017, the greatest strain on Bangladesh-Myanmar relations have been the sudden influx of over 700,000 Rohingya Muslims into Bangladesh, now hosted in camps in Cox’s Bazar. Efforts at repatriation face numerous challenges and deep-rooted problems.
First, the Rohingya lack safety and citizenship in Myanmar, fearing violence, arbitrary arrest, or persecution by the military if they return. Second, under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingya are not recognised as citizens, rendering them stateless and severely restricting their rights. Third, they face severe restrictions on movement within Rakhine State, living under apartheid like conditions confined to camps or villages, requiring permits to travel. Finally, access to essential services such as healthcare and education is extremely limited, while employment opportunities are largely denied.
Previous Rohingya repatriation attempts in 2018, 2019, and 2022 failed, as Myanmar refused to accept the returnees without formal agreements. The situation has become even more precarious following the 2021 military coup, which has further destabilised Myanmar. At the same time humanitarian aid is dwindling due to donor fatigue. Under the current circumstances, it is highly unlikely that Myanmar will make concessions to ensure the Rohingya’s safety, legal rights, or citizenship.
Like several other South Asian nations, Bangladesh is not a signatory to international refugee conventions or protocols and is therefore not legally obliged to use the term “refugee” in official documents. Instead, the Bangladeshi government refers to the Rohingya as “forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals.” At present, roughly one million Rohingya live in overcrowded camps in Cox’s Bazar, placing significant strain on Bangladesh’s economic, environmental, and security stability. The prolonged presence of the Rohingya has also fuelled local resentment, heightening the risk of social tensions.
Border Security and Counterterrorism
Bangladesh’s 271 km border with Myanmar has long been affected by terrorism, insurgency, cross-border arms trade, and transnational crimes, including human and drug trafficking. The remote and mountainous terrain along the Naf River has become a haven for criminals and militants. These challenges underscore the urgent need for stronger cooperation between the two nations to safeguard border security and counter terrorism.
In early 2022, a Bangladesh Army non-commissioned officer, along with three others, was killed in a terrorist attack in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). More recently, dozens of people have been killed or abducted in the CHT due to sporadic clashes between the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Myanmar security forces. Such incidents highlight the cross-border dimension of insecurity that threatens both nations.
While terrorism and militancy remain significant challenges, a growing cyber security threat further highlights the importance of intelligence sharing and capacity building through military cooperation. Another pressing concern is narcotics smuggling. Bangladesh’s Department of Narcotics Control has identified the Myanmar border as a major entry point for illegal drugs such as methamphetamine (Yaba) and opium. Myanmar forms part of the Golden Triangle, and along with Thailand and Laos is one of the world’s largest opium producing regions. Although Bangladesh has disrupted drug running networks and detained traffickers, sustained engagement with Myanmar’s authorities is essential for a lasting solution.
There are precedents for bilateral security cooperation. Myanmar military officials have previously participated in training programmes at the Bangladesh Defence College and the Defence Services Command and Staff College. At the institutional level, dialogue continues, and in 2022, a conference between Border Guard Bangladesh and Myanmar’s Border Guard Police was convened, where Bangladesh stressed the need to maintain peace and curb cross-border crime through confidence building measures.
These issues also feature prominently on the agenda of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the sub-regional grouping that includes both nations, where terrorism and transnational crime are recognised as shared threats requiring collective action. Strengthening bilateral security ties, both regionally and multilaterally remains essential to ensuring stability along the Bangladesh–Myanmar frontier.
Strained Relations
Despite tensions over the unresolved Rohingya crisis, border instability, and Myanmar’s post-coup turmoil, Bangladesh and Myanmar have successfully resolved their maritime boundary disputes through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The Tribunal recognised the rights of both nations to the continental shelf but rejected Myanmar’s equidistance claim. In 2012, it awarded Bangladesh demarcated boundaries, including 111,000 square kilometres of the previously disputed area in the Bay of Bengal. Since then, Bangladesh has been developing offshore energy resources based on the newly established boundaries.
Even after the latest wave of Rohingya displacement in November 2017, both nations signed an instrument of ratification demarcating their boundary north of the River Naf. This demonstrates that, despite broader political and humanitarian tensions, Bangladesh and Myanmar can resolve disputes peacefully through established international mechanisms like ITLOS.
Regional Connectivity
Myanmar shares a 271 km southeastern land border and a maritime boundary with Bangladesh, occupying a strategic position between two of the world’s largest economies—India and China. This location presents an opportunity for both nations to serve as intermediaries between these regional powers.
Despite the relatively short border, physical connectivity between Bangladesh and Myanmar remains limited. Developing land routes through Myanmar could provide Bangladesh with direct access to China in the east and open connections to other Southeast Asian nations to the south.
In 2007, a few connectivity projects were proposed. The first was a direct 23 km road link from Taungbro in Bangladesh to Bawlibazar in Myanmar. The second involved a 130 km railway track from Dohazari in Bangladesh to Gundum in Rakhine via Ramu in Cox’s Bazar, as part of the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR), a UN initiative designed to link several Asian countries, including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore to Europe through Turkey.
If Bangladesh and Myanmar were to accelerate bilateral cooperation, they could capitalise on their geographic proximity to unlock diverse business opportunities. However, these projects have yet to materialise due to land acquisition challenges, high construction costs, and a lack of political will. In the absence of direct road or rail links, maritime routes have become vital, making improvements to jetties and port facilities essential.
Enhanced connectivity would not only boost trade and commerce but also generate cultural and economic benefits through tourism. Although there were previously two direct flights per week between Dhaka and Yangon, these were discontinued due to financial losses by Biman Bangladesh Airlines, limiting cross-border tourism.
Bangladesh has considerable potential in this regard, with approximately one million Buddhists and numerous historical sites, including the temple at Moheshkhali and the 8th century monastery at Paharpur. In 2015, Bangladesh highlighted its Buddhist heritage by hosting an international conference in Dhaka on “Developing Sustainable and Inclusive Buddhist Heritage and Pilgrimage Circuits in South Asia’s Buddhist Heartland,” calling for the development of cross-border tourism not only with Myanmar, but also with other Buddhist majority nations such as Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Japan.
Trade Potential
Both Myanmar and Bangladesh are members of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the sub-regional grouping BIMSTEC, positioning them strategically for enhanced regional cooperation. Despite shared economic and security interests, bilateral engagement remains limited and underdeveloped.
The potential for trade growth between the two nations is substantial, particularly in sectors such as energy, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture. However, progress has been hindered by political tensions, infrastructural constraints, and a lack of sustained diplomatic initiatives. Realising this potential will require a renewed commitment to dialogue, targeted investment in connectivity, and a pragmatic approach to regional integration.
In 2020, total bilateral trade stood at approximately $112.58 million, with Bangladesh exporting $48.5 million and Myanmar exporting $64.08 million. In FY 2022–2023, Bangladesh exported $34.79 million worth of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, garments, and agricultural products to Myanmar, while importing $150.98 million in food items, agricultural products, and consumer goods.
Although the balance of trade remains heavily tilted in Myanmar’s favour, Bangladesh has attempted to reduce this deficit by establishing direct bilateral trade through letters of credit in January 2012; as previously, trade was routed via third countries such as Singapore or Thailand.
Myanmar’s geostrategic location and abundant natural resources including copper, tungsten, tin, zinc, natural gas, and hydropower, offer significant potential to meet Bangladesh’s growing energy demands. Expanding trade would not only yield economic benefits for Myanmar but also provide strategic advantages. Bangladesh could serve as a gateway for Myanmar to access the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, thereby linking ASEAN with South Asia. This could help both nations diversify their economic partnerships and reduce overdependence on regional powers like China and India.
Conclusion: Toward a Balanced and Resilient Bilateral Future
The trajectory of Bangladesh-Myanmar relations will be shaped not only by the resolution or persistence of the Rohingya crisis, but also by how both nations navigate shared opportunities and challenges. While historical grievances and humanitarian concerns remain deeply rooted, broader strategic imperatives such as connectivity, trade, and regional stability should be actively pursued.
Bangladesh’s approach must be rooted in strategic patience, diplomatic agility, and regional cooperation. By decoupling contentious issues from areas of mutual benefit, Dhaka can adopt a dual track policy: one that continues to advocate for Rohingya rights while simultaneously advancing national interests in energy, trade, and security.
Myanmar, in turn, must recognise that sustainable development and international legitimacy depend on resolving internal conflicts and engaging constructively with its neighbours. The future of Rakhine State, and by extension, the Rohingya population, will serve as a litmus test for Myanmar’s willingness to reform and reconcile.
In an increasingly multipolar world, Bangladesh must also avoid overreliance on any single power. Instead, it should leverage its strategic location and multilateral platforms to build a resilient foreign policy that promotes peace, prosperity, and regional integration.
Although the road ahead is complex, principled pragmatism can enable Bangladesh to transform its southern frontier from a zone of crisis into a corridor of opportunity.