Is Rooppur the foundation of Bangladesh’s energy future, or a costly monument to poor negotiation, foreign dependence, and missed renewable opportunities?
Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture in its energy future as the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant nears operation and discussions continue over further nuclear expansion. While nuclear power promises reliable baseload electricity, Rooppur has also tied Bangladesh to long-term foreign debt, imported fuel, and external technical support, raising questions about its contribution to genuine energy security. At the same time, rapidly falling renewable energy costs and Bangladesh’s significant solar potential offer alternative pathways that are cheaper, faster to deploy, and less exposed to geopolitical risk. The key challenge for policymakers is therefore not simply whether nuclear power can generate electricity, but whether continued investment in nuclear energy represents the most economically sustainable and strategically resilient approach to meeting the country’s future energy needs.
The Financial Architecture of Vulnerability
The financial structure underpinning Rooppur should, on its own, alarm policymakers. The contracted cost for the plant’s two VVER-1200 reactors (2,400 MW) stands at approximately $12.65 billion, with total expenditure now estimated at around $13.2 billion, roughly $5,500 per kilowatt of installed capacity, a figure strikingly high by international standards. Comparable projects tell a very different story. For example, Russia’s VVER reactors at Kudankulam in India were initially constructed for around $1,300 per kilowatt, rising to approximately $3,000 in subsequent agreements. Even after allowing for Bangladesh-specific factors, experts estimated a fair cost of $3,000–$4,000 per kilowatt. Instead, Bangladesh agreed to terms that were considerably more expensive than those secured by comparable countries.
This disparity was not inevitable. It reflects a clear asymmetry in bargaining capacity, with Bangladesh entering negotiations with limited technical expertise and weak institutional leverage, while India’s agreements were backed by decades of regulatory experience and negotiating depth. The financing model further magnifies these vulnerabilities. Roughly 90% of the project is funded by Russia at LIBOR +1.75% (capped at 4%), repayable over 28 years. While these conditions initially appeared manageable when the taka traded near 80 per US dollar, depreciation to around 122 has sharply increased the local currency burden, pushing total costs toward Tk 1.39 trillion. Electricity costs have risen accordingly, from early projections of around Tk 6 per kWh to closer to Tk 10 even before full operation, undermining any claim to competitiveness.
Repayment terms remain rigid, structured into 40 equal semi-annual instalments over 20 years with penalties for delays. Construction setbacks have eroded the grace period intended to allow revenue generation before repayments began, tightening fiscal pressure. The sanctions imposed between 2022 and 2024 exposed a critical weakness in the financing model. Although Bangladesh had the funds available, payments to Russian banks were disrupted, demonstrating how geopolitical shocks can directly affect essential infrastructure projects. Although penalties were waived and repayments deferred until September 2028, delays continue to accumulate costs, with completion now potentially extending to June 2028. Each postponement compounds both financial and opportunity costs. For a country already grappling with foreign-exchange constraints and rising import bills, this is not energy security, it is debt-financed dependence, structurally amplifying vulnerability rather than resilience.
The Geopolitical Creditor Problem
Rooppur’s risks extend beyond economics. By relying on Russia for around 90% of its financing, as well as for fuel and technical support, Bangladesh has created a long-term strategic dependency on a geopolitically exposed partner. The disruption of payment channels following sanctions on Russia demonstrated how international political developments can directly affect the project, while continued reliance on Rosatom for financing, operations, and fuel supply may leave Bangladesh vulnerable to external pressures and uncertainties for decades to come.
Expanding to a second nuclear plant would only deepen this dependence, particularly at a time when Bangladesh has already borrowed over $11 billion under rising debt pressure. The country’s external debt servicing has surged from $56 million in 1975-76 to $3.5 billion in 2024-25, with total public and publicly guaranteed debt reaching $188.79 billion or 41% of GDP. Reserve buffers have collapsed from more than 75% of total external debt in 2016 to just 21.5% in 2023. Proceeding further without first demonstrating operational and financial viability would significantly compound both economic and geopolitical risk. As one analyst noted, Bangladesh is already taking fresh loans at high interest rates to buy oil and LNG. Adding substantial nuclear debt obligations to this burden would further strain an already fragile external financing position.
The Illusion of Nuclear Prestige
Beyond the balance sheet lies a more subtle problem: the myth of nuclear prestige, the belief that possessing nuclear power is inherently a marker of national advancement, regardless of its economic or strategic value. Supporters of Rooppur have portrayed Bangladesh’s entry into the “nuclear club” as evidence of technological progress and national achievement. Yet the reality is less impressive. Russia is providing the technology, financing, fuel, and much of the operational expertise, while India is training Bangladeshi personnel. Bangladesh is effectively purchasing a turnkey facility rather than developing an indigenous nuclear capability.
Unlike the nuclear programmes established by countries such as France, India, and China, Rooppur does not represent technological self-sufficiency or strategic autonomy. Instead, it reflects dependence on external financing, imported fuel, and foreign expertise. The appeal of nuclear prestige has therefore distracted policymakers from a more important question: whether committing such vast resources to a single project represents the most effective way to strengthen Bangladesh’s energy security and support its long-term development.
The Solar Alternative Bangladesh Neglected
The most compelling criticism of Bangladesh’s nuclear strategy is the opportunity cost of neglecting its vast renewable energy potential. Despite receiving some of the most favourable solar irradiance levels in the world, Bangladesh has made limited progress in expanding rooftop solar, with only 245 MW installed between 2008 and 2025 and an estimated 375 MW of capacity in Dhaka remaining underutilised due to the absence of an effective net-metering system. While solar installations were mandated for new buildings more than a decade ago, the regulatory and grid infrastructure needed to support widespread adoption has not kept pace.
The challenge has therefore been one of policy implementation rather than resource availability. Countries such as Vietnam, Morocco, and Germany have demonstrated how consistent policy support can rapidly scale renewable energy deployment, even with less favourable conditions. A $5 billion investment in distributed solar and utility-scale renewable projects, less than half the cost of Rooppur, could potentially have delivered 5,000–8,000 MW of domestic generating capacity while reducing reliance on imported fuel and foreign financing. Yet despite a target of sourcing 20% of electricity from renewables by 2030, current investment and policy measures remain insufficient, highlighting a significant gap between Bangladesh’s renewable energy ambitions and its actual priorities.
A Balanced Assessment
Nuclear power does offer some benefits for Bangladesh. It can provide reliable baseload electricity regardless of weather conditions, has relatively low fuel costs once operational, and may deliver long-term value over a reactor’s lifespan. Under favourable assumptions, some analysts suggest that electricity from Rooppur could be generated at a competitive cost. However, these potential advantages must be weighed against the project’s substantial capital costs, exposure to foreign currency debt, and the uncertainty surrounding Bangladesh’s ability to operate and maintain a nuclear power programme independently over the long-term.
If nuclear energy is to remain part of Bangladesh’s energy mix, it should be pursued with greater financial and strategic caution. Future agreements should maximise local participation, reduce foreign exchange exposure, and strengthen domestic technical capacity. More importantly, Bangladesh should prioritise the development of its significant renewable energy resources before committing to further nuclear expansion. Any proposal for a second nuclear power plant should be deferred until Rooppur has established a proven record of safe and reliable operation and the country’s fiscal position is better equipped to absorb the risks of additional large-scale nuclear investments.
Conclusion
Rooppur will provide much needed electricity for Bangladesh, but the key issue is whether its benefits outweigh its costs. While the plant may contribute to power generation, it also leaves Bangladesh exposed to long-term obligations linked to foreign financing, imported fuel, external technical support, and geopolitical developments beyond its control. As a result, the project risks creating a new form of dependence rather than delivering genuine energy security.
Looking ahead, Bangladesh’s energy future should be built on diversification rather than reliance on a single mega project. Greater investment in renewable energy, grid modernisation, and energy efficiency would strengthen resilience while reducing financial and strategic risks. With Rooppur now nearing operation, the focus should shift from justifying the project to evaluating its real world performance. Until the plant has demonstrated reliable operation, its costs are fully understood, and the country’s renewable energy potential has been more fully developed, plans for a second nuclear power station should be approached with caution. True energy security depends not on the scale of one project but on the affordability, diversity, and resilience of the energy system as a whole.