Since the 1971 Liberation War, Bangladesh–Pakistan relations have remained characterised by enduring political tension and intermittent normalisation efforts, raising critical questions about the prospects for reconciling deep-rooted historical and structural differences.
The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 fundamentally reshaped South Asia’s geopolitical landscape. Born from a brutal liberation war against Pakistan, Bangladesh’s independence left enduring scars that continue to influence Dhaka–Islamabad relations more than five decades later. The legacy of historical trauma remains deeply embedded in Bangladesh’s national consciousness. Despite shared religious, cultural, and historical ties, the bilateral relationship has been consistently strained and marked by mistrust, unresolved grievances, limited economic engagement, and shifting geopolitical dynamics.
While recent diplomatic overtures suggest a renewed interest in normalisation, genuine reconciliation hinges on both nations confronting historical truths and balancing pragmatic cooperation with domestic sentiment. The shifting regional landscape presents both challenges and opportunities for redefining this fraught relationship. Bangladesh–Pakistan ties remain a delicate tapestry of historical trauma, political divergence, and cautious diplomacy.
Historical Legacy and Political Estrangement
The secession of East Pakistan and the birth of an independent Bangladesh in December 1971 marked one of the most traumatic episodes in South Asian history. According to the Bangladeshi government, the war claimed approximately three million lives, displaced millions more, and witnessed widespread atrocities, including systematic sexual violence. Pakistan’s initial refusal to recognise Bangladesh, coupled with its reluctance to accept responsibility for wartime actions, laid the groundwork for decades of bitterness and mistrust. Although formal diplomatic recognition came in 1974 under pressure from global powers and Islamic nations, the wounds of the past remained unhealed, and the memory of the Liberation War continues to shape public sentiment and policy in Bangladesh.
Recent shifts in geopolitical dynamics, domestic priorities, and regional realignments have prompted both Dhaka and Islamabad to explore the possibility of normalising relations. The central question remains: can two nations, bound by a shared yet fractured history, move beyond symbolic gestures toward genuine reconciliation? While new diplomatic overtures offer hope, the challenge lies in navigating political complexities and confronting the historical truths that continue to overshadow bilateral ties.
Formal Apology
For Bangladesh, the path to reconciliation remains closely tied to Pakistan’s acknowledgment of its actions during the 1971 Liberation War. Successive governments in Dhaka, particularly under the Awami League, have consistently called for an official apology and accountability for wartime atrocities. While Pakistan has expressed sorrow and regret, domestic political sensitivities and military influence have prevented any full-fledged apology. In 2002, President Pervez Musharraf visited Dhaka and conveyed “regret” for the events of 1971 but stopped short of a formal apology. As a result, the issue resurfaces during nearly every high-level diplomatic exchange, perpetuating mistrust and impeding deeper engagement.
Historical precedents from around the world demonstrate that reconciliation is possible when states confront their past with honesty. In 1970, German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt at a Holocaust memorial in a powerful gesture of remorse. The US Congress formally apologised in 1988 for the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. In 1995, French President Jacques Chirac acknowledged state complicity in the deportation of Jews. More recently, Japan apologised to South Korea in 2016 for its use of Korean “comfort women,” and in 2022, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte apologised for colonial-era violence and slavery.
This unresolved past continues to cast a long shadow on present diplomacy, making Pakistan’s reluctance to issue a formal apology a recurring obstacle to reconciliation.
Post-Hasina Rapprochement
The ousting of Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2024 brought an immediate shift in the diplomatic tone between Bangladesh and Pakistan. Within months, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and the Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s Interim Government, Muhammad Yunus, held meetings on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and the D-8 Summit, signalling a shared intent to reset bilateral relations.
During the 2024–25 fiscal year, bilateral trade increased by 20 percent, from approximately $712 million to $865 million. In November 2024, direct sea trade resumed for the first time in over five decades, and by January 2025, Bangladesh’s Civil Aviation Authority approved operations for Pakistan’s budget airline, Fly Jinnah, to launch direct flights on the Karachi–Dhaka route. High-level military contacts also recommenced, with exploratory discussions on expanding defence cooperation.
The Yunus-led interim administration has articulated a foreign policy vision of “friendship to all,” marking a clear departure from the Awami League’s India-centric approach. This reorientation opens new possibilities for pragmatic re-engagement between Dhaka and Islamabad after more than a decade of strained ties.
Revitalised Bilateral Relations
In less than a year, Dhaka and Islamabad have restored high-level communication and revived economic ties. The visit of Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar (also serving as Deputy Prime Minister) alongside Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan, marked the most senior Pakistani delegation to visit Dhaka since 2012. These meetings, focused on trade diplomacy, signalled more than ceremonial gestures; they reflected a deliberate effort to reset bilateral relations.
Yet for Bangladesh, the unresolved legacy of the 1971 Liberation War remains deeply embedded in its national consciousness. Public sentiment, shaped by decades of historical memory, cannot be easily set aside. Dhaka has repeatedly urged Islamabad to formally acknowledge its wartime atrocities, but Pakistan continues to view the 1974 Tripartite Agreement (which included India) as a final settlement. However, the treaty neither addressed the issue directly nor has any Pakistani head of state issued a formal apology. This lingering discord remains a significant obstacle to any meaningful rapprochement.
The goal, however, should not be to erase the past, but to ensure it does not imprison the future. Whether this diplomatic opening evolves into a deeper strategic partnership will depend on how both nations navigate the complex interplay of history, politics, and pragmatism. For two countries bound by a turbulent and intertwined past, the present moment offers a rare opportunity to revisit history, recalibrate relations, and reimagine the future.
Regional Geopolitics
Bangladesh’s foreign policy has traditionally balanced pragmatism with sensitivity to regional geopolitics. Unlike Pakistan, whose external relations have long been shaped by its rivalry with India, Dhaka has prioritised regional connectivity, trade, climate resilience, and socio-economic development. For New Delhi, Bangladesh has been a critical partner in maintaining stability along its northeastern frontier and in countering insurgent groups that once operated from Bangladeshi territory. Under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, India–Bangladesh relations reached unprecedented levels of cooperation, encompassing energy trade, security coordination, and water-sharing agreements.
The political changes of 2024, however, have altered this dynamic. With Sheikh Hasina’s ousting and the rise of Yunus’s interim administration, Bangladesh has signalled a more diversified approach to foreign relations, moving away from an India-centric alignment. This recalibration coincides with a gradual warming of ties between Dhaka and Islamabad, raising concerns in New Delhi about a shifting regional balance.
The prospect of closer Bangladesh–Pakistan ties cannot be fully understood without factoring in Beijing’s role. China is already Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and a major investor in infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications. Dhaka’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has created new economic opportunities but also deepened dependence on Chinese financing. Pakistan, meanwhile, remains Beijing’s “all-weather partner,” with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor serving as the flagship BRI project. Stronger cooperation between Dhaka and Islamabad could serve as a bridge for expanding China’s strategic reach into the Bay of Bengal, a development India views with considerable apprehension, given concerns about increased Chinese naval presence and leverage over Bangladesh’s economic and military decisions.
Strategic Implications for Pakistan
For Pakistan, the warming of ties with Bangladesh offers both symbolic and strategic value. Historically strained due to the legacy of 1971, relations between Islamabad and Dhaka have remained cautious. However, recent diplomatic overtures such as high-level visits, trade discussions, and cultural exchanges suggest a deliberate effort to reset the relationship.
Improved ties with Bangladesh could help Pakistan break out of its regional isolation and diversify its partnerships beyond the Gulf and China. It also provides Islamabad with a potential ally in South Asia that is not aligned exclusively with India. While the relationship is still in its early stages, the symbolism of reconciliation carries weight, especially as Pakistan seeks to project a more moderate and cooperative image internationally.
India’s Strategic Response to Shifting Regional Dynamics
India is unlikely to remain passive in the face of Bangladesh’s growing engagement with Pakistan and China. New Delhi possesses a range of diplomatic, economic, and strategic tools to counterbalance these developments. One potential response could be the imposition of non-tariff barriers or import restrictions on Bangladeshi goods, particularly in the garment sector, which relies heavily on access to Indian and global markets.
India may also seek to recalibrate its relationship with Bangladesh by broadening its outreach beyond the Awami League. This could involve engaging with emerging political parties, civil society organisations, and influential business groups, thereby hedging against future political shifts in Dhaka.
On the security front, India is likely to enhance intelligence cooperation and surveillance along its northeastern frontier to mitigate any destabilising effects of changing regional alignments. If Bangladesh deepens its military ties with Pakistan, New Delhi may respond by strengthening defence partnerships with other South Asian and Indo-Pacific nations such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka, and by deepening strategic coordination with the United States and Japan under Indo-Pacific frameworks.
Bangladesh’s Balancing Act
Dhaka faces the delicate task of strengthening ties with Pakistan and China while maintaining its crucial partnership with India. Nearly a quarter of Bangladesh’s trade flows through India linked routes, and cooperation on cross-border rivers, energy infrastructure, and security remains vital elements that cannot be easily substituted by Islamabad or Beijing.
To avoid the perception of a zero-sum realignment, Bangladesh must frame its renewed engagement with Pakistan as part of a broader strategy of diplomatic diversification. This approach should emphasise functional areas of cooperation such as trade facilitation, cultural exchange, and academic collaboration while steering clear of overt military or strategic moves that could provoke Indian concern.
Additionally, Dhaka could reassure New Delhi by pursuing trilateral or multilateral frameworks that include India, thereby balancing its outreach to Pakistan with continued engagement across the region.
Conclusion
Since 1971, Bangladesh–Pakistan relations have been shaped by trauma, mistrust, and missed opportunities. The enduring shadow of the Liberation War, particularly Pakistan’s failure to offer a formal apology, continues to influence bilateral dynamics. Economic ties remain underdeveloped, cultural exchanges limited, and political relations often strained. Yet, the evolving geopolitical landscape offers space for cautious cooperation. Shared challenges such as climate change and economic development present opportunities for engagement that transcend historical grievances, provided both nations adopt a pragmatic approach that separates unresolved historical issues from present-day imperatives.
The recalibration of Bangladesh–Pakistan ties in the post-2024 era adds new layers of complexity to South Asia’s fragile security architecture. For India, the growing influence of China in both Pakistan and Bangladesh heightens concerns about strategic encirclement, while for Bangladesh, expanding diplomatic and economic horizons must be carefully balanced against the risk of undermining its vital partnership with New Delhi. Ultimately, whether historical wounds remain a barrier or become a foundation for cooperation will depend on political will, domestic constraints, and the broader regional balance of power. Genuine normalisation will require both principled reflection and pragmatic diplomacy.