Globalisation Rewired: The West-Global South Bifurcation and the Next World Order

Introduction: The Illusion of De-Globalisation

The prevailing narrative in international affairs analysis today often forecasts the end of globalisation, driven by the increasing trend of global fragmentation, aspirations for enhanced autarchy and national sovereignty, and especially the deepening geopolitical rifts between the Western-led order and the growing constellation of BRICS+ and Global South powers. Yet what most commentary misreads is not the seriousness of this bifurcation, but the nature of the transformation underway. Despite the intensifying separation into Western and non-Western camps, the fundamental structural logic of globalisation—its drive for digitalisation and technocratic governance, networked finance, and transnational integration—has not diminished. On the contrary, it is expanding and deepening, drawing greater portions of the world into its reach and routines.

What distinguishes the present era is that the emergence of new, ostensibly separate systems—spanning financial, technological, diplomatic, and trade—is not a straightforward reversal of globalisation, but rather a profound evolution of it. Both the new institutions under construction by China, the BRICS+ group and the Global South more generally, and the ongoing adaptations of Western-led structures themselves, in reality, are emerging as remarkably similar architectures. These systems mirror one another in their mechanisms, logic, and ambitions, representing not a rollback but an enlargement and deepening of the world order established in the late 20th century. The very process of bifurcation is thus also one of ongoing globalisation and integration, albeit for now under competitive and hybrid auspices rather than under a single, integrated global governance regime and ideology.

From Reformist Aspirations to Defensive Autonomy

The expansion and consolidation of the BRICS bloc in particular over the past several years have marked a decisive shift in the architecture of global geopolitics. Once seen as a loosely affiliated set of emerging powers, BRICS now stands as an increasingly coherent and influential geopolitical coalition, encompassing ten full members and a growing list of formal partners and aspirants. This wider and deeper integration—driven by strategic pivots into regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia—enables BRICS not only to amplify its collective voice on reforming the global order, but to project power and agency across major issues of governance, security, and economic development. The bloc’s expanded membership, unified summit declarations, and proactive engagement in shaping global institutions signal a new phase of assertiveness, and the emergence of a more multipolar international system, but a multipolarity of blocs rather than one of a more distinctly 19th century nation-state centred variant.

Contrary to many contemporary narratives, the motivation for China, Russia, and the wider BRICS bloc to develop parallel institutions and infrastructures, however, was not rooted in a desire for systemic rupture. For much of the post-Cold War era, leading powers in the Global South strove to achieve greater representation within established mechanisms—the IMF, World Bank, and WTO most crucially. Notable progress, such as incremental voting reforms at the IMF during 2008 and 2010, did marginally increase shares for China, Brazil, and other emerging economies. Yet, as policymakers from within those negotiations have attested, the core governance arrangements remained essentially untouched, with control anchored to a Western consensus led by the United States and the EU.

The frustration grew most acute as the multilateral reform processes repeatedly stalled or were cynically disregarded. Written commitments from Western capitals, tabled at the highest levels, were rarely honoured in subsequent board deliberations, while aspirations for greater voice from the Global South were systematically sidelined. The US Congress in particular blocked any IMF reforms for years. As a result, the hope for genuine transformation of the Bretton Woods institutions gradually gave way to a hardening consensus: that exclusion was not an aberration, but a fixture, and that the Global South would need to construct its own alternatives if it wished to set its own developmental priorities.​

It is within this context that the major institutional innovations of the BRICS and even more importantly the broader Global South must be understood. The accelerating bifurcation we can witness today did therefore not stem from a rejection of the prevailing international order per se, but from necessity: a defensive response to the weaponisation of interdependence and the persistent denial of equitable participation in shaping global rules by the previous leaders and shapers of the international order, the collective West. 

The myriad institutional and procedural developments across the Global South have also filled major gaps in the international architecture, not least with respect to infrastructure development initiatives, which the World Bank has long refused to fund, and regional and interregional financial safety nets to cushion against sudden liquidity shortages and financial crises.

How the Ukraine War Accelerated the Emergence of a Parallel System

The acceleration of the BRICS’ and Global South’s drive for greater institutional and technological autonomy reached a decisive inflection point in the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Western response—swift, coordinated, and strategically maximalist—represented a sea change not only in the use of sanctions, but also in the operational capacities of the global financial infrastructure. The exclusion of Russia from SWIFT, the freezing of hundreds of billions in foreign reserves, and the imposing of secondary sanctions on dozens of states and a spectrum of commercial actors reflected a new reality: access to the core nodes of the Western-led economic order had become explicitly contingent on political conformity.​

This weaponisation of the dollar-centric system generated ripple effects well beyond Russia’s immediate partners. States across the Global South found themselves confronted with the fragility of prior assumptions: that participation in the legacy international system—however contentious—would be ultimately governed by rule-bound coordination. Instead, what transpired was the instrumentalisation of institutions like SWIFT, Euroclear, and Western central banks, transforming them from custodians of neutrality into leverage points in the accelerated geopolitical competition.​

For the Global South, the Ukraine crisis did not simply affirm long-standing suspicions and resentments about Western dominance—it compelled action. 

Accelerating Global South Integration and Institutionalisation

The emerging separation between the Western system and the BRICS-led Global South, however, represents a qualitative leap beyond the “managed interdependence” of the Cold War. In that era, despite ideological confrontation, the Soviet Union and associated states remained deeply tied to the Western dollar circuit, unable to escape the gravitational field of Bretton Woods institutions and dollar-pegged commodity flows. The current geopolitical moment on the other hand is marked by the deliberate construction of operationally independent systems with global reach—systems that aspire not merely to coexist with Western paradigms but to provide functional alternatives.

Technical work on alternative structures has accelerated dramatically since the onset of the Ukraine war. Cross-border settlement in local currencies, already a stated objective, became a matter of strategic urgency. China’s CIPS system expanded in both volume and regional integration, not least on the back of the rapid and largely unnoticed internationalisation of the Chinese banking system, providing a channel for renminbi-settled trade from Eurasia to the Middle East and Africa. India’s UPI system began to connect with payments networks in Southeast Asia and the Gulf. Russia’s domestic MIR network—initially a post-2014 response—became an essential regional platform as Visa and Mastercard exited en masse.​ 

Even more ambitious has been the onset of integration of the diverse national systems under the emergent BRICS Pay framework, anticipated to network 185 countries and directly challenge the primacy of SWIFT and CHAPS. This platform, coupled with ongoing discussions about a digital or asset-backed BRICS currency, signals an intent not only to bypass Western-controlled message and settlement channels but to convene an entire financial ecosystem that can operate beyond the reach—or approval—of Washington, London, or Brussels.​ Notably, Project mBridge has been continued by its participants despite the exit from the project of its original initiator, the Bank of International Settlements. 

De-Dollarisation of Global Trade Gathers Pace

Simultaneously, countries across the Global South have accelerated their shift away from using the US Dollar to settle their bilateral trade. Russia and China now settle most of their bilateral trade in ruble and yuan; most trade within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is now settled in local currencies; India has introduced rupee settlement mechanisms for trade with Russia, Sri Lanka and the UAE; Saudi Arabia and UAE both have conducted high-profile oil and LNG deals with China in yuan; and even Brazil, on the back of the Trump administrations introduction of punitive tariffs against the country, has started to settle trade with China in yuan and reais, while also developing yuan clearing and expanded local currency agreements. Commodity exchanges in Shanghai and Moscow have also achieved new milestones in launching and attracting commodities contracts denominated in non-Western currencies, further accelerating trends toward de-dollarisation in global trade.​

Meanwhile, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement expanded, providing members and aspirants with a buffer against liquidity shocks and speculative attacks. Regional Financial Arrangements (RFAs), some long established, have also grown dramatically: the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the Latin American Reserve Fund now collectively rival the IMF in available liquidity, and are increasingly linked through dialogue with the EU and other regional actors. 

The infrastructural landscape of the Global South is also being transformed through enhanced engagement with BRICS-led development finance and digital integration. The New Development Bank, celebrating its tenth anniversary and welcoming new members, in addition to extending emergency credit lines and liquidity to previously underserved regions, has also set up local currency lending facilities supporting green industries, climate initiatives, and urban modernisation. 

The Explosion of Intra-Global South Trade

Global trade flows have also been shifting decisively over the past decade, away from the status quo powers of the West and towards increased intra-Global South trade: Intra-ASEAN trade now exceeds US$850 billion annually, China–ASEAN trade has surged past US$900 billion, and the upgrading of the ASEAN–China FTA in late 2023 further deepened supply-chain integration in electronics, agrifood, and intermediate goods. Similar patterns hold across the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, where countries have revived and expanded older trade frameworks, pursued new bilateral and mini-lateral agreements, and strengthened inter-regional cooperation—from renewed ASEAN–EU and EU–Mercosur negotiations to exploratory contacts between ASEAN members and the CPTPP. 

We can also witness a significant upgrading of existing trade agreements, such as between ASEAN and China as well as new arrangements such as the interlocking China-Gulf-ASEAN FTAs. Economic integration initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) complement these institutional developments by connecting East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, facilitating immense non-Western trade flows. Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, especially its Digital Silk Road extension, spreads digital infrastructure through Africa, Eurasia, and the Middle East, knits together trade corridors, and introduces smart customs and logistics, further decoupling key nodes of global commerce from the West.​ 

These rising trade, settlement, and logistics corridors—including those advanced by the Belt and Road Initiative, RCEP, and the expansion of BRICS Pay—are pulling much of Africa, Asia, and Latin America into denser webs of commercial and technological interconnectivity.​

Diplomatic and Military Coalescence

Expansion of BRICS membership has been equally profound. Recent admissions—from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, to Iran, and with 8 more countries applying for membership—signal a redefinition of the bloc’s geographical and strategic horizons, swelling its share to nearly half the world’s population and some 40% of global GDP when measured by purchasing power. Notably, the inclusion of energy giants and key manufacturing hubs enables deeper integration of supply chains and trade networks independent of the G7’s jurisdiction. BRICS now exercises decisive influence over global oil, gas, and strategic minerals—a position enhanced by the growing footprint of intra-bloc trade agreements and supply chain reconfiguration.​

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), meanwhile, having incorporated India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus, now transcends its origins in security coordination, evolving into a platform for multi-sectoral integration. The recent launch of the SCO Development Bank marks a strategic push to fund regional infrastructure and connectivity, while ongoing security dialogue demonstrates operational capacity beyond the remit of Western alliances, further adding to the efforts of NDB and AIIB in filling the gap in the international system for infrastructure investment.​

Security cooperation has also widened in unexpected directions—such as the deepening Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–GCC ties—while US sanctions and tariffs have prompted both discrete evasion and the smoothing of long-standing intra-Asian tensions, exemplified by renewed China–Japan–South Korea trilateralism and a thaw in Australia–China relations.

The cumulative effect of all these developments, catalysed by the Ukraine war and Western financial escalation, has been a qualitative leap: the BRICS and Global South economies have moved beyond rhetorical opposition, engaging in the rapid and concrete construction of a still piecemeal but emerging parallel architecture. Rather than isolating dissenters, the weaponisation of interdependence has instead globalised the ambition and momentum for monetary, trade, diplomatic and systemic pluralism, setting the stage for a sustained evolution of the international order.

Crucially, this pan-regional expansion means that the new architecture of globalisation is not a bifurcation into discrete, inward-looking blocs, but rather a dynamic proliferation of overlapping networks and initiatives. The role of previously peripheral actors has become decisive: the Global South is now driving new standards of digital infrastructure, climate financing, and institutional reform, with BRICS functioning as the principal forum for their articulation and advancement. 

Not the End of Globalisation, But Competitive Symmetry: Western and BRICS Systems Mirror Each Other

The proliferation of parallel BRICS and Global South institutions, structures and connectivity platforms, however, does not signal a retreat of the global order or the end of globalisation. Instead, it marks the accelerated integration of the Global South into an emergent framework for cooperation, digitalisation, development and technocratic governance. This is a direct evolution from the preceding era, when much of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and large parts of Asia existed within the global order in marginal or satellite roles—often objects of trade competition or development experimentation, rather than as architects or genuine stakeholders.​ This movement has thus shifted the role of the Global South from that of a passive participant to an agenda-setting force, shaping and accelerating new modalities of globalisation that are as inclusive as they are transformative.

Beneath the headline rivalry between the Western-led order and the emerging BRICS and Global South alternatives lies a deeper structural reality: both camps have converged on similar technocratic logics, infrastructures, and instruments to manage economic, financial, and social domains. While rhetoric often fixates on “systemic difference,” the operational architectures being developed—digitised central bank money, crisis liquidity mechanisms, integrated development banks, and digital identification platforms—display a growing symmetry.​

Western powers, seeking to maintain their leadership, have accelerated the rollout of digital currencies (the digital euro, the Bank of England’s digital pound, and even the stablecoin initiatives of the Trump administration) and more integrated, real-time payment frameworks. In parallel, the expansion of digital identity initiatives—such as the European Union’s Digital Wallet—signal a move towards centralised, networked control over societies, financial access, and social rights. These advances are frequently justified on grounds of financial stability, combating illicit flows, and enhancing economic inclusion, yet their implications for data concentration and surveillance are clear.​

What emerges is a technocratic race in which both the West and BRICS are experimenting with the same broad toolkit: cross-border settlement networks, swap lines and emergency liquidity, central clearing, and institutional lending. The New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement mirror the World Bank and IMF in mandate if not in legacy, just as BRICS Pay and China’s CIPS echo SWIFT’s central messaging and settlement functions. Surveillance infrastructures—whether in the form of China’s social credit system, India’s Aadhaar, or Western digital ID rollouts—demonstrate that technocratic management is no longer a regional quirk but a near-universal imperative.​

Both orders thus increasingly vie for their respective positioning within otherwise convergent frameworks, rather than for the erection of completely alternative orders: the contest is not over whether networked digital capitalism should prevail, but which bloc will set the direction, underlying standards, and governance norms for a global order defined by programmable money, instantly traceable logistics chains, and cross-border crisis response. This symmetry, while exacerbating immediate competition, also lays the groundwork for possible future interoperability—should political will ever emerge for convergence rather than continued bifurcation.​

In sum, the transformation now underway is less about irreconcilable models and more about rival efforts to control—and ultimately harmonise—the foundations of networked globalisation. Both sides have come to embrace a similar set of institutional and technical solutions, highlighting that, even as bifurcation persists, the underlying logic binding the international system grows stronger and more transparent.

The Risks Ahead—No New “Rules of the Road”

Despite growing institutional and infrastructural symmetry between the Western-led order and the BRICS bloc, the emergence of parallel systems has not led to the reconstitution of mutual regulatory guardrails that characterised earlier eras of confrontation. During the Cold War, the existence of robust arms control agreements, structured diplomatic channels, and crisis management protocols helped contain escalation and imposed predictability on rivalry. In today’s re-bifurcated world, many of these regulatory mechanisms have atrophied—or failed to adapt—leaving both blocs exposed to heightened systemic risk.​

Core multilateral fora such as the WTO and G20, once critical platforms for trade dispute resolution and collective action, have lost much of their efficacy, paralysed by gridlock and politicisation. The IMF, for example, now lacks the financial capacity to deal with a major international liquidity crisis and would need at least the coordinated help of the RFAs. The breakdown of global non-proliferation frameworks and the hollowing out of legacy institutions like the UN Security Council further erode the “rules of the road,” multiplying uncertainties across the diplomatic and security landscape. The weaponisation of finance, trade, and technology—now central pillars of Western and BRICS competition—exacerbates the situation. The increasing use of sanctions, export controls, and financial exclusions as instruments of national power creates arenas susceptible to miscalculation and escalation, with impacts reverberating through supply chains as well as commodity and financial flows worldwide.​

This erosion of formalised crisis containment is particularly visible in the political flashpoints of Ukraine, Taiwan, and the broader Middle East, where the lack of binding mutual restraints elevates the stakes for regional and global stability. Channels for dialogue remain uneven, while the proliferation of new financial, digital, and technological architectures introduces added complexity—diminishing transparency, speed, and reliability in both statecraft and commerce. Even as economic links persist beneath the surface, the institutional underpinning necessary for consilient management of risk has fallen behind the speed and scale of global bifurcation.​

Ultimately, the emerging order remains in flux, marked by innovation and ambition but shadowed by fragile crisis management capabilities. The current global system, built on increasingly rival platforms and weakening global regulatory frameworks, lacks the comprehensive “rules of the road” that allowed prior phases of globalisation—even under rivalry—to function with deeper assurance. In so doing, it remains to be seen whether the evolution underway is inexorably bound for a more resilient multipolar regime, or entering a period of unmanaged competition in which friction and uncertainty are set to multiply.

Conclusion: Globalisation’s Next Phase—Both Rivalry and Interdependence

The evolving international order is defined by both a profound bifurcation and an equally significant process of system alignment. The emerging division between the Western-led order and the Global South is unmistakably real, animated by genuine geopolitical tensions and sustained strategic competition. Yet to cast this development as the unravelling or end of globalisation is to overlook the deeper currents restructuring the architecture of global interdependence. Far from fragmenting the international system, the creation of parallel financial, political, and technological infrastructures is rewiring the world in ways that are inclusive of previously marginalised actors, especially within Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia.

The expansion and institutionalisation of BRICS, combined with intensified regional frameworks like RCEP and transcontinental projects like China’s Belt and Road Initiative, demonstrate a dynamic process in which ever greater portions of the Global South are incorporated into a technically sophisticated and more multipolar, yet also global, world order. This order remains bifurcated today, and probably become even more so in the short to medium term, but is underpinned by structurally convergent logics—digital currencies, integrated financial systems, cross-border crisis mechanisms, and trade and production networks are being developed in both Western and BRICS frameworks, revealing a shared technocratic vision.

Yet this rivalry is far from settled. The dissolution of Cold War-era regulatory guardrails, the weaponisation of finance and the continued unipolar aspirations of the collective West raise severe risks of escalation and fragmentation. The fragmented institutions and the absence of new, effective “rules of the road” between competing blocs generate systemic vulnerabilities that demand urgent political solutions if the global order is to avoid more complete fracture.

Ultimately, the trajectory humanity now faces is one of rivalrous interdependence: a complex and sometimes contradictory coexistence where competition and cooperation are tightly intertwined. Whether this ongoing evolution results in a durable multipolar equilibrium or a more fragmented and fractious world remains uncertain. What is clear is that leading states across both poles of power—West and Global South—must navigate this landscape not only by fortifying their own architectures but by seeking pragmatic and forward-looking forms of connectivity and governance that leave the door open to more genuine and collaborative global governance. In this subtle balance lies the possibility for a new phase of globalisation—one that reflects the complexity and plurality of the 21st century, rather than the assumptions and structures of the last.

About the GPI

The Global Policy Institute is a research institute on international affairs. It is based in the City of London, and draws on both a rich pool of international thinkers, academics as well as policy and business professionals. The Institute gives non-partisan guidance to policymakers and decision takers in business, government, and NGOs.

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