The quota system introduced by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for freedom fighters in 1972 has once again been thrust into the spotlight. Like a social-timebomb, the anti-quota protests organised by the Anti-Discrimination Students’ Movement ousted Sheikh Hasina’s regime, granting Bangladesh its ‘second independence’.
The historic events of 5 August 2024 were the culmination of the ever-growing dissent against the last 15 years of autocratic rule by former Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina and her regime. Nevertheless, the seeds of discontent were sown much earlier on 8 April 2018, when university students went onto the streets to protest for quota reform. It was the culmination of years of failed attempts of carrying out similar protests. Up until that time, 56 percent of Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) jobs were covered by quotas, the majority, 30 percent, going to the children and grandchildren of freedom fighters who participated in the country’s liberation movement in 1971. Even though the widespread protests were brutally repressed by the security forces and the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the student wing of the ruling Awami League (AL) party, the government agreed to negotiate with the students. The key demand made by the protestors was to reform the quota system from 56 percent to 10 percent. However, in a surprise turn of events, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina grudgingly ordered the scrapping of the quota system except for the provisions that protected minorities and people with special needs. On 4 October 2018, the Ministry of Public Administration issued a circular abolishing the quota system.
What is the quota system?
The quota system is positive discrimination for equal opportunities in public employment for the freedom fighters of 1971. In September 1972, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman introduced the BCS quota system via the Interim Recruitment Rules, issued and implemented by an administrative order. In 1973, a few hundred freedom fighters were appointed into the BCS through the quota system after passing a 100-mark oral examination. While the initial objectives of the quota system in a war-ravaged country were a principled position, it was acknowledged that an overhaul was desperately needed. The government-appointed Administrative & Services Reorganisation Committee, headed by Professor Muzaffar Ahmed Chowdhury, recommended abolishing the quota system in favour of merit-based system so the country could invest and build a reliable and high-quality civil service. Despite similar concerns raised by subsequent reform commissions and committees, the quota system was not abolished. Instead, privileges for the children of freedom fighters were extended in 1997, and in 2011 also came to include their grandchildren. It is important to note that the quota system determines the recruitment of doctors, teachers and various other jobs which directly impacts the lives of students who must work with the system that disadvantages them. To add insult to injury, any vacancies not filled by the descendants of freedom fighters are kept vacant instead of being filled by qualified students of merit.
Due to the discriminatory nature and the inefficiency of the quota system, what the students demanded was legitimate. The system had to be reformed in accordance with the changing context that included a high-literacy rate among the population as well as extremely high-levels of unemployment among university graduates. Without modernising the civil service, its quality would not be in line with the needs of the Bangladeshi population, especially tackling the challenges and realities of the 21st century. On top of that there are added complexities in applying via the existing quota system that has been highlighted by the Bangladesh Public Service Commission which recommended simplifying the process in the interest of public service. Between 1971-72 there were 100,000 certified freedom fighters, however, this number has now tripled to approximately 300,000 freedom fighters. There is uncertainty regarding this number especially as many individuals have forged freedom fighter certificates to claim benefits as their descendants. Although the quota movement is not against freedom fighters benefiting from the system per se, the question they raise is whether the benefits should be extended to their descendants, and if so, for how many generations?
On 5 June 2024, the High Court demanded the reinstatement of the 30 percent quota of BCS posts reserved for the descendants of freedom fighters following a writ petition filed by the descendant of a freedom fighter and six others, thus overturning a 2018 decision by Hasina’s regime to scrap it. Initially Hasina’s stance was that it was a legal matter proceeding in the courts, and therefore, she was unable to intervene. However, the High Court stated that if her regime wanted to, then it could bring changes to the quota system itself. Hence, to claim that her regime had no role to play was blatant misinformation. For instance, if the regime decided to form a committee to engage with the student demands, then they could have kept in place the protected groups within the quota and reform other parts. Instead of listening and having dialogue with the students the regime opted to take a hostile route, spreading unnecessary negative remarks as well as provoking with wordplay. Not only were Hasina’s comments derogatory, but they were also very provocative. What mostly angered the protestors was the regimes autocratic behaviour, denying ordinary citizens the right to protest or voice their needs, or face heavy consequences. To maintain the status quo, the BCL and the security forces were used as weapons.
How the regime responded
Protests began on 1 July by the student-led non-political Anti-Discrimination Students’ Movement, which demanded the fair treatment of all job seekers through the criteria of merit. Organised through Facebook, for the first two weeks thousands of students from the University of Dhaka and the University of Chittagong boycotted classes and exams, blockaded the police station in Shahbagh, a popular square in Dhaka, as well as major transport intersections and highways around the country. Many young people across the country were agitated because they and their families were struggling financially as well as living under autocratic rule which constantly attacked their rights and freedoms. These factors influenced their decisions and actions to come onto the streets and stand up against the power structure. Criticising the quota movement, AL General Secretary and Road Transport and Bridges Minister, Obaidul Quader at a press conference on Sunday 14 July, remarked that the BCL was ready to give a fitting response to the ‘audacious behaviour’ shown on university campuses and teach a lesson to those who ‘undermined’ the spirit of the Liberation War. This raised the question as to why veteran politician Obaidul Quader, himself a former journalist who was previously involved in student politics, wanted to use the BCL to deal with a movement that had wide public support? Quader was calling for direct action and giving the green light for violence. BCL President Saddam Hussain echoed Quaders sentiments but used sanitising language such as ‘the BCL was prepared to tackle the students through political means’.
However, the protests took a drastic turn when Sheikh Hasina in response to a journalist’s question at the same press conference said, “Why do they [anti-quota protesters] have so much resentment towards the freedom fighters? If the grandchildren of the freedom fighters don’t get quota benefits, should the grandchildren of Razakars get the benefit?” In the Bangladesh context, Razakars (Pakistani collaborators) is a ‘loaded term’ that invokes hateful memories of war crimes committed by Razakars in 1971. Calling or labelling groups or individuals Razakars is an often-used method of silencing dissenting voices against the AL regime. Students flooded the campus of the University of Dhaka on the same night Sheikh Hasina made her derogatory comment. It touched a nerve with the wider student community leading to students exploding in protest with renewed vigour. Students shouted, “Who are you? Who am I? Razakar, Razakar! Who says that? Who says that? Autocrat. Autocrat!” On 21 July, the Supreme Court suspended the High Court’s order and directed that 93 percent of jobs should be open to candidates on merit after Hasina’s regime appealed the decision. But even this massive concession of revising the quota system, assigning just 7 percent of jobs to the descendants of freedom fighters did not end the unrest as by then at least 139 people had been killed. From the direction the protests were heading in, it was clear that they would only stop once Hasina and her regime relinquished power.
Foot soldiers of the regime
Unlike 2018 when the regime agreed to negotiate with the students, two-weeks into the protests the harsh crackdown by the regime ensured that it would turn violent. On 16 July, student protestors and the BCL both called for a rally inside the University of Dhaka. When the unarmed student protestors started to gather, police personnel vacated the university grounds. Then BCL activists confronted the student protestors and attacked them in broad daylight with sticks, metal rods, and guns, causing injury among many student protestors. These criminal actions were carried out in the presence of news media cameras and were replicated at other prominent universities in the capital as well as in Chittagong and many other cities around the country. That same night BCL activists supported by the police went around looking for protestors and attacked students seeking medical help at Dhaka Medical College Hospital. The BCL in collusion with the police and the university authorities were complicit in the violence perpetrated against the student protestors. Ironically, the BCL even tried to justify their actions by claiming they were trying to prevent unrest in the campus and ‘upholding the spirit of the liberation war’.
Putting to shame the British colonial and Pakistani police, the responses of law enforcement agencies in dealing with the protests were appalling. In many instances not only did they turn a blind eye but were also complicit through their inaction and even aided and abetted criminal acts, particularly those committed by the BCL. Despite images and video footage of the perpetrators circulating widely in the print, electronic and social media, law enforcement agencies pursued the victims. Several daily newspapers even published photos, names as well as their positions within the BCL of those accused of violent acts, however, they were free to roam around university campuses intimidating their victims while members of law enforcement agencies were chasing the victims. If the law were left to take its own course instead of being politicised, then the perpetrators would have been charged with criminal offences, including possession of dangerous weapons in public, causing serious bodily harm, and unlawful abduction and detention. It is disappointing that the BCL, which has a long democratic tradition has become synonymous with violence, tender-grabbing, extortion and interfering in departmental appointments and dictating accommodation in residential halls in key institutions.
Abu Sayed – icon of the movement
On 16 July, the lone breadwinner of a poor family, with aging parents and a younger sister, Abu Sayed, a 25-year-old student at Rangpur’s Begum Rokeya University took to the streets for his right to a fair chance in getting a government job. Only 15 metres away, he stood alone facing the police who had earlier indiscriminately teargassed, and baton charged the protesting students. With his arms stretched out wide open in a gesture of defiance and armed with nothing but courage to confront the unlawful actions of the security forces, showing no restraint, a police officer shot him four times. A few moments later Sayed fell to the ground and died. Sayed’s extrajudicial killing was captured by a news media outlet and was shared like wildfire online. This caused immense shock and pain around the country and ignited a fire that brought hundreds and thousands of students onto the streets, determined more than ever to see through their demands of quota reforms. Teachers, lawyers, parents and people from all walks of life joined in solidarity with the students, in anger and mourning over the death of Sayed as well as Mughdo and Faiyaaz and the other 500 protestors that were killed within a short space of time by the regime-aligned armed forces and its student activists. Sayed became an icon for the Anti-Discrimination Students’ Movement and a rallying point against state sanctioned violence and discrimination. Sayed and all those that died in the protest had their lives taken from them by a regime who wanted to hold onto power by whatever means instead of making systemic change in the BCS recruitment process.
Internet shutdown and economic losses
On the evening of Thursday 18 July, the government imposed a complete internet shutdown in Bangladesh which cut the country off from the rest of the world. This was the first lengthy internet shutdown that lasted over 150 hours, and by timing it with a curfew the next day, people were restricted in accessing both the digital and physical spaces. On 19 July, TV channels reported the regimes official line for the internet outage was due to a fire at critical internet infrastructure in Dhaka. Initially the regime attempted to conceal its role in the blackout as ICT Minister Zunaid Ahmed Palak, mentioned enforced shutdown resulted from security concerns to restore normalcy during the complete breakdown of law and order in which over a hundred people were killed in just three days. However, under scrutiny the excuses quickly crumbled. International observers like Cloudflare and Telenor confirmed that it was a deliberate government ordered shutdown of 3G and 4G networks, which occurred against the backdrop of massive student protests. This was nothing new as internet shutdowns have been used as a tool of control by a regime that had repeatedly supressed mass uprisings by controlling the flow of information.
People around the country were unable to access essential online digital services like online banking, utility bill payments, mobile credit recharge, and online communications. According to estimates of the Bangladesh Association of Software & Information Services, a loss of Tk 80 crore was incurred just in the first 24 hours of the outage. Non-profit organisation NetBlocks estimated that the 150-hour shutdown almost certainly cost Bangladesh’s economy $500 million dollars, which further exacerbated the country’s economic challenges making recovery more difficult. The E-Commerce Association of Bangladesh reported significant financial losses to the sector in 13 days in July that amounted to Tk 1,700 that included e-commerce, e-tourism, and e-logistics. Approximately 95 percent of e-commerce transactions remained suspended during that period due to the curfew and security concerns, causing huge reputational damage for those operating in the sector. Eventually when Internet services were partially restored, the sector continued to struggle largely due to very low internet speeds.
A shutdown during protests leads to information blackouts and prevents the vital flow of information which can only lead to the spread of rumours, fake news, and misinformation. It also represents a dangerous threat to democracy and human rights. The unprecedented act of digital repression not only violated the fundamental human rights of 170 million Bangladeshis, but it also allowed the government to exercise its control to curb protests in the digital age, something it had done over the last decade. Moreover, shutdowns hinder the work of local and international media outlets, as well as human rights organisations from documenting potential human rights violations. Hasina’s regime did not want to be exposed to the large-scale killings and excessive force used by her security forces against the protestors. In Bangladesh, the freedom of expression and mass mobilisations around common political issues have always been severely restricted. With the blackout people were being denied access to news websites, social media platforms, and messaging apps, whereby the regime was effectively silencing the country and preventing the outside world from witnessing what was happening in Bangladesh. Being cut off from the rest of the world imposed its own psychological toll on the people.
A nation under curfew
A nationwide curfew was imposed on 19 July following the deaths of 35 protestors in Dhaka alone. The immense socio-economic cost to ordinary citizens and businesses around the country was very concerning. However, it did not have to be so dire. For example, if the regime did not shutdown internet service for such a prolonged period, then businesses could have continued operations online and people could have purchased essential supplies online as well as access medical services. While it was necessary to impose a curfew to prevent further violence, it should have been done in a way that that would have minimised the harm to the economy. Ordinary consumers have already been suffering immensely as prices of essentials have shot through the roof as inflation hit a record 12-year high. This was further exacerbated with supply chain disruption across the country, whereby the transportation of perishable commodities to major cities remained scarce, allowing traders to hike the prices of most goods. The ongoing economic crisis had been present even before tensions escalated across the country, and the impact on the poor and low-income groups has been devastating as scores of new poor have been created, with many cutting back on their meals and nutritional intake. It is estimated that direct gross domestic product (GDP) lost was no less than $1.3 billion daily since 18 July, when everything came to a standstill until 5 August.
Downfall of a hated autocrat
Bangladesh’s ‘Iron Lady’ Sheikh Hasina ruled the country for 15-years with an iron fist, crushing all dissent and protests with brute force. Her stubborn refusal to compromise over the BCS quota recruitment and her overreliance on the state security apparatus and deep patronage favouring her close associates and supporters ultimately caused her downfall. She assumed that excessive brute force would work this time as it had done previously. However, this time she did not grasp the levels of discontentment of the student protests which morphed into a mass movement including people from all walks of life, angry over a multitude of issues and demanding change. Hasina’s hubris and faith into her own political invincibility stemmed from the fact that she was the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh, and that as such she was the undisputed ‘daughter of democracy’. In the end, after 36 consecutive days of mass protests around the country, her regime collapsed like a deck of cards, forcing her to resign and leave the country for India, unlike the previous autocrat H. M Ershad who stayed in the country and faced the music.
Vandalism and violence against minorities
The violence that ensued after the collapse of the regime was expected, as it was an immediate response to the outrage at the indiscriminate killing of so many protestors by the regimes security forces who were ordered to ‘shoot on sight’. The human cost included around 600 people, including many students killed while around 400 people were blinded because of firing by security forces.
Lawlessness also led to the ransacking of state property and the destruction of historical sites and landmarks relating to the 1971 Liberation War. On 19 July, while clashes were taking place between pro-regime forces and protestors, unidentified criminals took advantage of the unrest and carried out attacks on two stations of the Dhaka Metro Rail. Given that the police themselves had been discredited and were demoralised, they were unable to stop the senseless destruction which became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
While the country looks to rebuild after the downfall of Hasina’s regime, it should be done by safeguarding the rights and lives off all citizens regardless of religion, political persuasion, or social status. The insidious nature of social media propaganda must be countered with the realities on the ground such as coordinators of the quota movement as well as the BNP and Jammat-e-Islam and other parties instructing their members and activists to ensure no violence and reprisals against political opponents and minorities such as the Hindu community alleged to have widely supported the old regime are being perpetrated.
Aynaghor (House of Mirrors)
During Hasina’s rule it became evident how the AL became increasingly dependent on the security agencies. For example, the AL permitted security agencies to vet potential AL candidates whereby aspiring leaders at the union and district levels sought approval of the security agencies to achieve their political ambitions. Using the security agencies to extend AL domination, especially to destroy the opposition was not a new practice, nor was it something started by the AL. However, it was during Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule that the practice of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings became widespread and reached its zenith. After years of denial by the regime, disturbing details have emerged as victims of enforced disappearances gave their detailed accounts following their release after the dramatic collapse of the Hasina’s regime.
First reported in 2022 by Netra News, a Sweden-based independent news portal, Aynaghor was a secret detention facility reportedly run by the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), Bangladesh’s military intelligence agency which operates under the Ministry of Defence. DGFI heads reported directly to Hasina and her security adviser. The detention facility in Dhaka Cantonment detained critics and political opponents of the regime. Survivors have come forward with disturbing testimonies of alleged torture and killings. A retired Brigadier General and a Supreme Court lawyer were some of the high-profile detainees kept in Aynaghor for eight years and probably would have remained there if the regime did not fall. Indigenous rights activist Michael Chakma from the Chattogram Hill Tracts area was confined for 5 years (2019-2024), whereby his family held a funeral in absentia thinking he would not return to them. While incarcerated, detainees were shackled around the clock in solitary confinement in underground cells that measured 2.5 feet wide, 4 feet long, and 5 feet high. They were blindfolded throughout their captivity, except for showers and when going to the toilet. While the enquiry commission on forced disappearances will shortly publish its report, the DGFI has stated it will open all 23 Aynaghors and allow families and human rights activists to visit them.
Development and cooking the books
For many years, Bangladesh has subscribed to a development model centred on high GDP growth, low wage manufacturing exports, mega infrastructure projects, and trickle-down economics. Bangladesh has built an export economy that is heavily dependent on low-wage manufacturing labour, particularly within the ready-made garment (RMG) industry, which ultimately is neither desirable nor sustainable. To put it simply, another country with lower wages can undercut Bangladesh’s RMG industry, in the same way it and Vietnam have displaced China in this respect. Since 2001, Bangladesh has maintained an average annual growth rate of 6 percent, however, income inequality has widened indicating the ‘economic benefits’ are not reaching those that need it the most. This is because during Hasina’s rule, the state and its institutions became predatory in nature, where a small but privileged cabal of political elites, bureaucrats, business leaders and politically affiliated people exploited the rest of the population. In this environment where state institutions were systematically weakened, policymakers tended to make political decisions instead of economic ones, which go against the principles of inclusive and sustained economic growth.
Modern autocratic regimes like Hasina’s tend to legitimise its hold on power through its narrative of economic accomplishments. During Hasina’s long authoritarian rule there was an absence of institutional checks and balances, hence, her regime could manipulate economic data. The official statistics for economic indicators such as GDP, export earnings, agricultural output, inflation rate, domestic consumption, and foreign export reserves, were all falsified and manipulated. The credibility of the GDP growth calculation presented annually was questioned by many prominent Bangladeshi economists, domestic think tanks as well as international organisations. For instance, it was clear that export and remittance growth did not correlate with GDP growth, nor did private investment correlate with industrial sector growth. This deliberate manipulation of GDP during the Covid pandemic was clear to see when data presented by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) showed significant growth in the transport and hospitality sectors even though those and other sectors suffered significantly because of the pandemic.
Furthermore, BBS inflation statistics did not match the realities on the ground. Despite the increase in fuel prices and essential commodities in the international market due to Covid and the Russia-Ukraine War, the BBS released data showing a decrease in inflation, even though the average person was struggling to keep up with the high prices in the domestic market. BBS data for January 2022 showed food inflation rates for urban and rural areas were 4.85 percent and 5.94 percent, respectively. However, according to the South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM), food inflation for the same period both for urban and rural areas was at 11.36 percent and 11.21 percent, respectively, which is double the rates claimed by the BBS. According to a recent investigative report by Bonikbarta, fabricated statistics were produced systematically under the instructions of former Finance Minister AHM Mustafa Kamal. Under his leadership, a group of 5-6 people within the BBS would manipulate critical data, including GDP growth, inflation rates, as well as exaggerate statistics on growth and industrial output. In relation to how the GDP was calculated, a former secretary of the statistics department stated, “I saw at a young age, what the GDP will be, is decided in advance. Later the calculation is fixed by ‘back calculation’”. The economic legacy of Hasina’s regime is that during its tenure it fabricated statistics such as GDP growth, inflation, unemployment rate, revenue income and agricultural production, which has now put Bangladesh’s economy in serious trouble.
Economic challenges left by the ousted regime
Bangladesh under Hasina’s regime can be accurately summed up through the ‘Bangladesh Paradox’, which is stable economic growth mixed in with bad governance that does not address the perpetuation of non-inclusive governance but cheerleads authoritarian tendencies. The quota protests are the manifestation of much bigger problem’s policymakers have overlooked for the last few decades. The nature of these problems is economic, political and social which have been veiled behind the quota movements suppressed anger, resentment, and deprivation that has existed in various forms in a country of 170 million people. Bangladesh’s biggest asset could be its relatively young workforce who constitute about 70 percent of the population. However, despite the economic progress over the past fifteen years it did not lead to enough job creation for young people in the country. The lack of employment opportunities resulted in unequal distribution of wealth across all sections of society. For example, in 2022, the top five percent of the population earned 30.04 percent of the national income which was an increase on the 27.82 percent of 2016. In a biased labour market where the opportunity for decent employment is limited, the result has been a high proportion of jobs, around 84.9 percent are in the informal sector where income and job security are very low.
Youth unemployment (18-29 years of age) currently stands at approximately 4.5 million which is 10% of the overall youth population and twice the national average for unemployment. Of the 18-29-year-olds, only a very negligible number will find high level employment in government services, because the overwhelming majority, including the descendants of freedom fighters do not have the opportunity to get the education needed to pass the qualifying exams. Government jobs are sought-after because salaries are higher, have numerous perks, and offer job security. Although most of the employment opportunities in the public sector exist in government schools, colleges, universities, and hospitals, thousands of positions remain vacant because privatisation is central to the regimes neoliberal development model. With stagnant private investment, the private sector cannot create the jobs needed in any meaningful way. Any access to the little employment opportunities that do exist have to be bought as they are not awarded according to merit. Hence, without monetary connections to the AL, the quota has become nothing more than the ‘ruling-party-affiliated quota’. The lack of employment opportunities among educated young people is a primary reason for societal dissatisfaction and upheaval as has been seen with the quota movement protests.
The interim government
Unfortunately, there are no quick fixes for the enormous challenges that face the interim government headed by Nobel laureate economist Dr Muhammad Yunus as it will require time and significant effort. Currently Bangladesh faces political instability, deterioration of law and order, and economic volatility.
Political instability affects the broader economic environment since it disrupts business operations as well as create an unstable financial climate that undermines domestic and foreign investor confidence. To pave the way for economic recovery the interim government must tackle the problem of soaring inflation which the previous regime is responsible for due to its unparalleled economic mismanagement. While official inflation rates drifted around 8 percent during the tenure of Hasina’s regime, the accuracy of these figures were widely disputed. With revised estimates by the BBS, the suspicions now appear to have been validated. Inflation has been surging since early 2022, and in July 2024 the inflation rate reached 11.66 percent, the highest it has been in the past 13 years, followed by 10.49 percent in August. Food inflation was higher as it hit a record of 14.10 percent which has been exacerbated by ongoing supply chain disruptions and shortages, therefore, inflation will remain high disproportionally impacting low-income households. To manage inflation, there must be the collection of accurate, reliable and timely data so informed decisions can be made. The interim government should consider restructuring the BBS, the department responsible for collecting key economic data.
The kleptocracy under Hasina’s regime has left the country in a dismal state, particularly the massive misgovernance in the banking sector and the bond market. In what can be described as mega-theft of the banks via loan scams, crony capitalism and outright corruption, the economic policymaking objective was to favour patronage and clientelism. Policies in the banking sector were dictated by politically connected individuals to exclusively support their vested interests at the cost of the national interest. For example, Hasina’s disgraced former Private Industry and Investment Adviser, Salman F. Rahman, known as ‘the father of default culture’, habitually took out loans from state and private banks only to default on them, thereby, exposing Bangladesh’s banking sector to serious risks while leaving several banks ‘clinically dead’ in the process. Poor governance has also allowed the sector to be overburdened with wilfully defaulted bank loans which stood at Tk 22,480 crore in 2009 and was Tk 156,038 crore by the end of 2023. Between 2008 and 2023, just 24 instances of irregularities were responsible for Tk 92,261 crore being taken out of the banking system. This equates to 2 percent of GDP of FY2023 and 12 percent of the national budget for FY2024. So that the banking sector does not beget a full-blown crisis that can potentially spill into other areas of the economy, the interim government must immediately set up a banking commission and simultaneously implement governance reforms given the depth of the malaise is to prevent an economic meltdown which would have socio-economic implications.
The broken structure of law and order, particularly the police force and its administration should be a major concern for the interim government. Even though it was the police which contributed to the downfall of Hasina’s regime due to its trigger-happy attitude towards civilians, it could act with impunity because it became an extension of the AL which used them not only to retain its power, but also to control its political opponents. A day before the regime was ousted, the police were subjected to public wrath through a deadly series of mob attacks which resulted in the killing of at least 44 members of law enforcement around the country as well as the burning of many police stations, which were regarded as symbols of oppression of the regime. The topmost priority of the interim government should be to bring the perpetrators in the police to justice, especially the ones who killed civilians and their superiors who gave them the orders to shoot. This should be simultaneously followed by the set-up of an independent commission to provide oversight and investigate rampant corruption in recruitment and end the use of the police for political gains. An assessment should be taken to improve police salaries and working conditions and consider the recent 11-point demand made by representatives of the police to the interim government. Police reform will be a complex process that requires strong political will and support from a broad range of stakeholders after which the police as a state agency and keeper of law and order, will serve the public which maintains its funding.
Conclusion
Bangladesh’s ‘second independence’ freed it from the grip of 15-years of autocratic rule where elections were rigged, and corruption was institutionalised to benefit regime loyalists and their cohorts. The quota reform movement initiated by students at public universities which later galvanised students at private universities, colleges, madrasas and schools, was an autonomous and organic movement that was later joined by siblings, parents and guardians of students and people from all walks of life. Their demand was to reform the quota system and to make it equitable for university graduates. However, the regime responded with a violent crackdown that ended up killing and injuring a significant number of protestors. As too many lives had been lost, public anger and outrage was only going to be satisfied with the ousting of the regime. The historic day of 5 August 2024 demonstrated how the youth successfully delivered regime change, something politicians failed to do.
Despite the economic mismanagement of the ousted regime, the key drivers of the economy such as the RMG sector and the inflow of remittances remain very much intact and can kickstart the economy, thereby, giving Bangladesh another chance to firmly establish itself as a ‘success story of development’. As the country looks towards the future, chief adviser to the interim government, Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus, a man of vision and integrity, driven by energy and honesty, has the support of young people and the confidence of the public to unite the country and resolves political differences non-violently. Dr Yunus’s speech on 11 September indicated that the process of reform to build a democratic, vibrant economic, and rights-based country free from the previous regime’s systemic corruption, nepotism and economic mismanagement was underway. Special commissions have been formed to perform much needed reforms to state institutions such as the Election Commission, judiciary, legal system and the police. Good governance measures have also been introduced to the fragile financial sector to increase private and foreign investment to revive the economy. These changes will not happen overnight, and the interim government must be pragmatic and realistic on what reforms it can deliver before handing over to a democratically elected government.
Finally, those in the security forces that have committed serious violations of human rights and their superiors who ordered them to do so must be brought to justice. For far too long the basic functioning of the police has remained unchanged. Improving the quality of law enforcement and rooting out corruption must be a permanent and integral part of the much-needed reforms which will put back public confidence in the rule of law. With the current power vacuum, breaking free from authoritarianism is a long and difficult road as the AL has ruled Bangladesh with a fortress of fear, thuggery, violence and corruption. This is why there is no appetite for dynastic politics where one set of authoritarian rulers and despots are replaced by another set. There needs to be political consensus for a long-term vision for Bangladesh. The youth no longer remain the ‘future of the country’ because they must be present in shaping and guiding the future of Bangladesh. At this critical juncture, the resilient people of Bangladesh need to be united to show the rest of the world that a Muslim-majority nation can be a strong democracy and can continue with its great economic journey whereby it develops its own model of a just society.