Resetting the Dollar: Gold Revaluation, Stablecoins, and the Reinvention of US Monetary Power?

The United States stands at a critical juncture in the evolution of the global financial order. For decades, the dollar’s dominance has rested on two pillars: the unrivalled liquidity of the US Treasury market and the political confidence that America’s fiscal and institutional system would remain credible and thus supportive of the continuation of the financial order. Both assumptions are now in question.

At home, rising debt and interest costs have turned fiscal management into a zero-sum exercise. Abroad, geopolitical shifts and the weaponisation of the currency and sanctions have driven even neutral states to seek alternatives to the dollar-centric nature of the current financial system. The combined effect is that the structural demand for US Treasuries, once underwritten by foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds, is eroding, leaving the Treasury increasingly dependent on domestic commercial buyers and the international operations of non-bank financial institutions.

In this context, Washington faces an uncomfortable reality: sustaining the dollar’s supremacy can no longer be assured by incremental reform, but may necessitate a more fundamental strategic reset. Such a reset could emerge from a fusion of old and new instruments of monetary power, namely gold and digital assets, in a strategy that would strengthen the national balance sheet, rekindle demand for Treasuries, and redefines how the dollar anchors the global system.

Declining Global Demand for US Debt

The post-war dollar system was built on a straightforward feedback loop. Foreign nations accumulated dollars through trade with the US, then recycled them into Treasuries or equities, while relying on the liquidity and safety of the US market to store reserves. For decades, this recycling model of globalisation sustained low US borrowing costs and ensured that global growth translated into guaranteed Treasury demand.

That world is fading fast. The share of US government debt held by foreign official institutions – central banks and sovereign wealth funds – has fallen from around 50% in the early 2000s to barely 25% today, according to Treasury data. While the amount foreigners hold in absolute terms has grown modestly, they have not done so nearly as fast as the total supply of Treasuries, resulting in a shrinking percentage. Nations like China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have reduced their holdings or let them mature without replacing them. This demand gap has been filled primarily by domestic financial institutions, money-market funds, and US households, reflecting a profound structural shift: the international public sector is no longer the premier marginal buyer of US debt. Although the United Kingdom and Cayman Islands have emerged as major holders, with UK-based custody banks and hedge funds now holding more US Treasuries than China, much of this total reflects custodial and investment flows for hedge funds and institutional clients, not genuine UK- or Cayman-resident, pension fund or government holdings.​

This erosion of external demand coincides with a significant surge in debt issuance. Federal debt has surpassed 125% of GDP, and with higher interest rates, servicing costs are projected to consume over a trillion dollars annually before the decade’s end. The arithmetic is simple and unsustainable: rising supply, falling foreign demand and appetite for longer duration bonds, and limited political will for fiscal restraint.

Geopolitics and the Fragmentation of the Dollar Order

The pressure is not purely of a financial nature; it is also geopolitical. The sweeping sanctions regime enacted against Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine has had a profound unintended consequence. They revealed that the dollar system no longer remains, or never was, merely a neutral medium for international trade and financial market operations, but could also be harnessed as an instrument of state power. The freezing of reserves and exclusion from SWIFT of Russia served as a warning to other nations that their own assets and payments could, under certain conditions, be quickly politicised.

Since then, a quiet revolution has gathered pace. The BRICS bloc of nations has expanded its membership and deepened its coordination on developing alternative payment infrastructures, settlement systems, and commodity pricing mechanisms. China’s CIPS, Russia’s SPFS, and multilateral platforms such as BRICS Pay have come to form the backbone of a gradual but deliberate strategy of monetary insulation. These efforts are not per se about overthrowing the dollar, but about minimising exposure to it, and by extension, to US oversight and its ability to weaponise the system for its own geopolitical ends.

The cumulative effect is subtle but powerful: less global dollar liquidity, lower structural demand for Treasuries, and the emergence of multiple centres of settlement and credit creation outside the prevailing dollar sphere. So, the very network effects that once entrenched dollar dominance are now beginning to fray.

The Debt Squeeze and the Imperative of Innovation

For Washington, this convergence of new fiscal and geopolitical realities presents an existential problem. The Treasury cannot indefinitely rely on domestic buyers to absorb record issuance without driving yields much higher. Nor can it easily pivot to austerity in today’s polarised political environment. The challenge the US now faces is how to restore balance-sheet strength and market confidence.

One way forward, even if constituting an audacious step, could be a strategic revaluation of US gold reserves.

Gold Revaluation as Strategic Shock Absorber

One of the few remaining levers available to Washington lies in an instrument long dismissed as anachronistic: US gold reserves. Officially, America’s alleged 261 million troy ounces of gold are still carried on the Treasury’s balance sheet at the statutory price of $42.22 per ounce, a figure unchanged since the early 1970s. At current market prices – roughly $4,500 per ounce – those holdings are worth well over $1 trillion, yet only about $11 billion is recognised in official accounts.

Revaluation would thus unlock serious spending power. The Treasury could, through statutory authorisation or executive direction, which President Trump is technically entitled to under the statutes of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, mark its gold holdings to market value and issue gold certificates to the Federal Reserve reflecting the difference between the book and market price. In exchange, the Federal Reserve would credit the Treasury General Account (TGA) with newly created dollars equal to that uplift.

Crucially, this process would not constitute borrowing. It would not raise the debt ceiling or add new liabilities; it simply recognises the market value of an existing national asset. The TGA would receive immediately liquid and spendable funds that could be used to support fiscal operations, repurchase outstanding long-duration debt, or finance strategic investments without any new issuance of national debt.

Beyond the accounting benefit, the symbolic impact would be profound. Revaluation would demonstrate that the United States still possesses tangible reserves of real value, reasserting confidence in the Treasury’s balance sheet at a time of mounting skepticism. Gold, often dismissed as inert, could thus be repurposed as the foundation for a new phase of financial innovation; not as a return to the gold standard, but as the launchpad for monetary renewal.

Most importantly, it could provide the initial capital base for the new US Sovereign Wealth Fund (US-SWF), established by executive order in February 2025. By channelling part of the revaluation windfall into this newly created fund, Washington could convert latent national wealth into a long-term investment vehicle, one capable of shaping the next frontier of global finance and reinforcing demand for US Treasuries through the burgeoning digital-asset economy.

A New Instrument of Fiscal Power: The US Sovereign Wealth Fund

Unlike traditional budgetary programmes, the US-SWF is not constrained by annual appropriations or deficit financing. Its purpose is to mobilise non-debt resources, i.e. surplus public assets, royalties, and, critically, any proceeds from the revaluation of US gold reserves, and transform them into productive capital. Revaluing gold to market prices could immediately credit the TGA with potentially over a trillion dollars, and a portion of that windfall could be transferred into the fund as available investment capital. In effect, America would be converting dormant balance-sheet wealth into a new and powerful investment engine.

From its inception, the US-SWF has been conceived as strategically unstructured, granting flexibility to allocate funds across asset classes and technologies that advance US economic sovereignty. Among its most consequential potential roles is participation in the digital-asset or crypto economy. By investing directly in blockchain infrastructure, regulated exchanges, and leading crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, XRP or Solana, the fund could both profit from and amplify the growth of the crypto market itself.

There would, however, be a deeper monetary logic to this. A rising crypto market cap in turn would also expand the use and issuance of dollar-denominated stablecoins, which function as the settlement medium of the new crypto economy. Because regulators are moving to require these stablecoins to be fully backed by US Treasuries, every new dollar of stablecoins in circulation becomes a new dollar of demand for US government debt. Thus, through its investments, the US-SWF could indirectly legislate a new additional structural demand for Treasuries, potentially capable of stabilising yields and strengthening the dollar’s continued role at the heart of the global financial architecture.

The logic is rather compelling. By requiring stablecoin issuers to hold Treasuries as collateral, as per the new GENIUS Act of 2025 (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025), regulators can channel global demand for digital dollars directly into the government’s debt market. Moreover, stablecoins broaden the reach of the dollar beyond banks and corporations directly to individuals worldwide. A farmer in Africa or a small business in Southeast Asia can now hold digital dollars on a phone, bypassing local currency volatility.

What makes stablecoins truly revolutionary, however, from the vantage point of monetary policy, is not only their reach but also their programmability. Unlike cash or bonds, programmable money can carry instructions: it can pay interest, expire after a set date, or adjust its value relative to benchmarks. This opens possibilities for debt management that were once unthinkable. In theory, stablecoins could be designed to gradually reprice liabilities, embedding a subtle form of debt devaluation directly into the monetary instrument. Such mechanisms would be controversial, even radical, but they illustrate the scope of innovation now possible.

These opportunities are reinforced by developments in global financial plumbing. In September 2025, SWIFT announced that it, together with several of the world’s largest banks, was building a blockchain-based ledger for cross-border payments. This system, still in development, could serve as the backbone for tokenised assets and programmable currencies. By aligning regulated stablecoins with this infrastructure, Washington could ensure that digital dollars flow seamlessly across the globe, maintaining their centrality in an era of technological change.

Over time, Congress and regulators could refine the requirements for stablecoin issuers even further, specifying the duration and interest profile of the Treasuries held, allowing policymakers to shape the Treasury market’s maturity structure through legislation rather than open-market operations. In this sense, the sovereign wealth fund would not merely generate investment returns; it would anchor a new feedback loop linking America’s tangible assets (gold), its digital assets (crypto and stablecoins), and its sovereign liabilities (Treasuries) into a single, mutually reinforcing system of monetary power.

The implications would be enormous. As the crypto market grows, potentially into the tens of trillions in aggregate capitalisation, the required Treasury collateral base would thus expand in parallel.

Gold, Crypto, and the ‘New’ Dollar

This strategy, if pursued, could fuse renewed dollar credibility with broadened reach. Gold revaluation supplies the fiscal foundation, restoring confidence in the Treasury’s balance sheet and funding the sovereign wealth initiative. Crypto investments would amplify global crypto adoption and market growth, which would indirectly also expand stablecoin usage and circulation. Finally, stablecoin regulation legislates that this new liquidity must be anchored in US Treasuries.

The result would establish a self-reinforcing ecosystem: a rising crypto market lifts stablecoin issuance; stablecoin issuance drives Treasury demand; Treasury stability strengthens the dollar’s credibility; and the dollar’s renewed dominance sustains the global digital economy that, in turn, would underwrite continued US global dominance.

Conclusion: The Reinvention of Monetary Power

The dollar system today faces its most serious challenge since Bretton Woods. The erosion of foreign Treasury demand, the rise of alternative multipolar financial structures, and the failed and counterproductive weaponisation of dollar payment networks have all contributed to undermining the foundations of continued US monetary primacy.

Yet within the current crisis lies the potential for the dollar’s reinvention. A strategic revaluation of gold could unlock dormant national wealth, providing the capital base for a sovereign wealth fund designed to project financial influence deep into the digital currencies market, and by extension directly into every single society globally. By coupling this with a regulated stablecoin architecture that channels crypto-driven liquidity into Treasury markets, the United States could legislate a new source of structural demand for its own debt, turning innovation itself into a fiscal stabiliser.

The synthesis of gold’s solidity and crypto currencies’ reach would mark not merely a financial adjustment, but a conceptual reframing of US monetary power, turning the US from the issuer of the world’s reserve currency into the architect of a new self-sustaining digital monetary ecosystem.

In that sense, the “reset” would not end the dollar order, but reboot it for the new, digital age.

About the GPI

The Global Policy Institute is a research institute on international affairs. It is based in the City of London, and draws on both a rich pool of international thinkers, academics as well as policy and business professionals. The Institute gives non-partisan guidance to policymakers and decision takers in business, government, and NGOs.

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