The 2025 ASEAN Summit
In his opening remarks at the 46th ASEAN Summit (Kuala Lumpur- 26-27 May) Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the current ASEAN chair, announced that he had written to President Trump, formally requesting a special USA-ASEAN summit[1] to negotiate the new tariff regime on behalf of all ASEAN member states. He reported that he had stressed the importance of protecting ASEAN’s collective interests and ensuring that any bilateral deals with Washington would not harm other member economies. That is, ASEAN aims to negotiate as a single entity, reinforcing the principle of unity and consensus while remaining open to bilateral discussions as needed (2025 Ashar; Juwita 2025; Ng 2025; Strangio 2025).[2]
In the Plenary Session held on 26th May it was confirmed that:[3]
- to prevent escalation and encourage constructive dialogue, retaliatory tariffs would not be imposed on the USA, which remains a critical trading partner for the region.
- a unified regional approach should be adopted, but recognised that individual national negotiation would continue.
- any bilateral deals individual ASEAN countries might strike with the US regarding tariffs must not harm the interests or economies of other ASEAN countries.
- a coordination body – the ASEAN Geoeconomic Task Force will be established ensuring that regional solidarity is maintained even as some countries pursue parallel bilateral talks with Washington.
- regional integration to be intensified (under The Five-Year Strategic Plan for Regional Integration[4]) and economic partnerships to be diversified (including deepening ties with China and the GCC) to mitigate the impact of US tariffs and broader geopolitical risks.
- ASEAN is not a shifting toward China or any single power, but rather demonstrating the group’s longstanding commitment to neutrality and universal diplomacy. (drawn from the ASEAN 2025 Chairman’s Statement)
In terms of point 5, it should be noted that the second day of the meeting saw the inaugural meeting of the Trilateral China-ASEAN-GCC Summit with proposals for two new FTAs that would interlock with a further upgraded ASEAN-China FTA. China was represented at this inaugural meeting and the plenary session by the Premier Li Qiang, who was also there to show support for the unified ASEAN approach to the tariffs (which Beijing had been advocating) and, with the President of AIIB, to promote BRI projects and investment in the context of the progression of ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (ASEAN 2025 Chairman’s Statement).
Behind both the Chair of ASEAN’s action and the decisions at the 2025 Plenary Session there lies a very large number of formal and informal meetings and exchanges across ASEAN and the wider East Asian region, that stretch back into the last part of 2024 but intensifying in the anticipation of the Liberation Day tariffs and even more in their wake.
How viable is the unified ASEAN approach
The ASEAN members have made a very important geopolitical statement. But it does beg many questions. Not least over the ability of ASEAN to maintain unity in the face of US and domestic pressures,[5] the reconciling of national and regional interests (including those of the wider East Asian region and its members) and the terms of reference (and powers) of the coordinating body. It is also the case, that ASEAN, despite very considerable achievements, has often been stronger on the rhetoric of regionalism that on action and has a history of announcing what proport to be critical organisations that have never become functional.
The wider East Asian context
China has ready made its support for the ASEAN approach very clear and all the indications are that Japan and South Korea would be supportive, but the critical point is whether they would to any degree participate in negotiations with the USA on a unified basis, under ASEAN+3 or, as has been widely suggested, RCEP (see for example Pangestu and Armstrong 2025). On the latter, it is perhaps significant that Australia has officially back the ASEAN approach (Shadiqe 2025).[6] [7]
Wider East Asian support would give the ASEAN position greater weight, but this would in practice mean little without some openly agreed participation in the negotiations. For given the low level of inter-ASEAN trade compared to the extent and complexity of ASEAN trade with China, Japan and South Korea, ASEAN could not protect the interests of its members in the absence of, at the very least, wider regional agreement on mutual protection. Critical here is the importance of regional trade to all of East Asia, the extensive regional institutional underpinnings and what seem to be increasingly cordial economic interactions between China, Japan and South Korea and their recognition of mutual interests (Gao 2025). The latter highlighted by the meeting of these North East Asian economies held on 31 March (Reuters 2025). But for the US, any Chinese role in a regional approach which would be essential for it to be meaningful, is likely to be a barrier to negotiation, unless some China-USA deal is established first.
Given indications of wider support for the ASEAN approach it seems unlike that the USA would respond aggressively, perhaps accusing the organisation of siding with China. More likely, is either some acknowledgement, and letting lie – perhaps until near the end of the 90 day ‘grace’ period, or even just quietly ignoring the ASEAN moves altogether. While Trump administration is of course being diverted by domestic court action over the tariffs, it has since the ASEAN communication agreed to re-engage with Thailand and Vietnam on a bi-lateral basis. Perhaps more disturbing are the demands contained in the US response to the 19-22 May discussions with Vietnam, this contains an annex with a list of demands which centre on the need to for reduction in dependency on Chinese imports (Guarascio and Nguyen 2025).
A step towards regional actorness?
The USA has yet to respond to the ASEAN proposal. But, almost regardless of where the tariffs and broader economic conflict goes, the ASEAN moves and the reaction of the rest of East Asia, may well prove to be a critical test of East Asian regionalism. This has seen remarkable progress since Trump I, moving into over-drive with Trump II. While there is no doubt that the USA could, if hell-bent on constraining China and separating it from the rest of the region, seriously damage both the key regional economies, ASEAN and the East Asian Regional Production System (EARPS) as a whole. But at what cost to the USA?
If the USA backs off, comes to an arrangement with China and allows a series of compatible agreements with the rest of the region, it will mark a major shift towards regional unity and global actorness. But there could equally well be the opening of a protracted and destructive economic conflict, if nothing worse.
References
ASEAN Chairman’s Statement (2025) ‘Charman’s Statement of the 46th ASEAN Summit Kuala Lumpur 26 May’, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/01.-FINAL-Chairmans-Statement-of-the-46th-ASEAN-Summit.pdf
Azhar, D. (2025) ‘ASEAN leaders agree tariff deals with US should not harm fellow members’, Reuters, 27 May, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/asean-leaders-agree-tariff-deals-with-us-should-not-harm-members-2025-05-27/
Gao, M. (2025) ‘Trump’s return drives closer cooperation in East Asia’, East Asian Forum, 4 June, https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/06/04/trumps-return-drives-closer-cooperation-in-east-asia/
Francesco Guarascio and Phuong Nguyen (2025) ‘Exclusive: US made ‘tough’ requests to Vietnam in trade talks, sources say’, Reuters, June 3, 202510:52 AM GMT+1Updated 4 days ago, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-made-tough-requests-vietnam-trade-talks-sources-say-2025-06-03/
Juwita, R. D. (2025) ‘ASEAN seeks to approach US tariff talks as one and expand China ties’ Jakarta Post, 27 May, https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2025/05/27/asean-seeks-to-approach-us-tariff-talks-as-one-and-expand-china-ties.html.
Ng, E. (2025) ‘Southeast Asian nations want to discuss tariffs with Trump as a unified bloc, Malaysia PM says’, AP World News, 25 May, https://apnews.com/article/malaysia-asean-tariffs-myanmar-trump-trade-73fcfea4374873da1591ae5aba68656b
Pangestu, M. and Armstrong, S. (2025) ‘Southeast Asia Central to Global Trade’, East Asian Forum, 25 April, https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/04/25/southeast-asia-central-to-global-trade-response/
Reuters (2025) ‘China, Japan, South Korea will jointly respond to US tariffs, Chinese state media says’, 1 April, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-japan-south-korea-will-jointly-respond-us-tariffs-chinese-state-media-says-2025-03-31/
Shadiqe, J. (2025) ‘Australia backs Malaysia’s call for joint ASEAN talks on Trump’s tariffs’, Business Times, 21 May, https://www.nst.com.my/business/corporate/2025/05/1219137/australia-backs-malaysias-call-joint-asean-talks-trumps-tariffs
Strangio, S. (2025) ‘Malaysia’s Anwar Seeks Trump’s Support for ASEAN-US Tariff Summit’, The Diplomat, 27 May, https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/malaysias-anwar-seeks-trumps-support-for-asean-us-tariff-summit/
Notes
[1] Tentatively proposed for October.
[2] Neither the full text of Anwar’s letter nor the transcript of the 26 May Plenary Session were available at time of writing (30 May).
[3] Compiled from the ASEAN Chairman’s Statement. 2025.
[4] An important contribution to this will be the Digital Economy Framework Agreement.
[5] These could build very rapidly in a several of the ASEAN countries, not least Thailand, in the face of bad economic news (and fears of worse) and demands from opposition parties and business groups to ‘do a deal’.
[6] There is so far no indication of New Zealand’s position – though it would seem likely that with its very small economy and 10% Liberation Day tariff, it would favour a purely bi-lateral approach.
[7] Taiwan, which is not formally linked to ASEAN, ASEAN+3 or RCEP would have little to gain by commenting one way or the other.